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REFORMING THE TAXATION OF DEFERRED
COMPENSATION*
ETHAN YALE** & GREGG D. POLSKY***

Executive pay is currently a topic of significant interest for
policymakers, academics, and the popular press. On August 14,
2006, in reaction to widespreadpress reports and academic criticism
of extravagant executive perquisites, the SEC proposed new
regulations designed to change fundamentally the manner in which
executive compensation is reported to shareholders. Despite all of
this attention, one significant aspect of executive deferred
compensation has gone virtually unnoticed-the federal tax rules
governing this form of compensation are fundamentally flawed and
must be extensively overhauled. These rules are flawed because
they often create a significant incentive for companies and their
executives to structure deferred, rather than current, compensation,
thereby producing highly inefficient and inequitable results. This
Article addresses potential legislative reforms that would remedy
this problem by neutralizing the tax treatment of current and
deferred compensation. While this neutrality goal, which was part
of the recent proposals made by President Bush's Advisory Panel
on Tax Reform,' is easy to describe in general and conclusory
terms, the devil is in the details. There has been little serious
academic analysis of how to implement a set of tax rules that would
create neutrality while avoiding undue complexity. This Article
attempts to fill that void.
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INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the deferred compensation packages negotiated
by corporate executives have been a topic of significant interest for
academics, policymakers, and the popular press. Newspapers have
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reported on extravagant deferred compensation packages, 2 most
notably former New York Stock Exchange Chief Executive Officer
Richard A. Grasso's $140 million deal.' In their illuminating book,
Pay Without Performance-The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive
Compensation, Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried decry the
"camouflage benefits" of executive deferred compensation. They
argue that captive boards of directors use these arrangements for the
primary purpose of passing tax benefits to executives (to the
company's tax detriment) under shareholders' radar screens.' And in
October of 2004, in an attempt to stymie some of the particular
abuses uncovered in the Enron fiasco,6 Congress revised the federal
tax laws applicable to executive deferred compensation for the first
time since 1978. 7
2. See, e.g., Riva D. Atlas, Fannie Mae To Review Pay Packages of Ex-Officials, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 28, 2004, at C1 (reporting deferred compensation of $8.7 million for former
Fannie Mae CEO Franklin D. Raines); Riva D. Atlas, FormerChief of Putnam To Receive
$78 Million, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2004, at C1 (reporting deferred compensation of $55
million for former Putnam CEO Lawrence J. Lasser); Theo Francis, Morgan Stanley's
Retiring CEO May Leave with $62.3 Million, WALL ST. J., June 14,2005, at A10 (reporting
a $62.3 million package for former Morgan Stanley CEO Philip Purcell); Timothy L.
O'Brien, Mayday? Payday! Hit the Silk! Golden ParachutesGlow Again, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
9, 2005, at C1 (reporting former Bank of America CEO Charles K. Gifford would receive
$3.1 million per year for life with survivor benefits of $2.3 million per year for his spouse's
life after his death); Andrew Ross Sorkin, Prosecutors in Tyco Case Press Ex-Chief on
Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2005, at C2 (reporting deferred compensation of $80 million
for former Tyco CEO L. Dennis Kozlowski).
3. See Landon Thomas, Jr., Big Board Chief Will Get a $140 Million Package, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 28, 2003, at C1.
4. LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE 105 (2004).

5. ld. at 105-06. Bebchuck and Fried also argue that the Securities and Exchange
Commission's disclosure rules regarding deferred compensation are inadequate, making it
difficult for shareholders to understand even the pretax cost of these arrangements to the
company. Id. at 106-07.
6. In the Joint Committee on Taxation's investigation of Enron, it found that
executives were able to "maintain," as a practical matter, "security and control" over their
deferred compensation accounts through a variety of contractual devices and that such
security and control was inconsistent with the tax deferral benefits received by the
executives. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
OF ENRON CORPORATION AND RELATED ENTITIES REGARDING FEDERAL TAX AND
COMPENSATION ISSUES, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 40 (Comm. Print 2003) (Sup.

Doc. No. Y4. T19/ 4:IN 8/3/v.1).
7. See I.R.C. § 409A (2000) (originally enacted as American Jobs Creation Act of
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 885(a), 118 Stat. 1418) (imposing rules that attempt to restrict
the ability of executives to maintain security and control over deferred compensation
accounts while deferring tax liability). Prior to the enactment of new I.R.C. § 409A, the
tax rules applicable to executive deferred compensation had been unchanged since
February 1, 1978, when Congress declared a moratorium on altering the tax rules then in
effect. See Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 132(a), 92 Stat. 2763, 2782. We do
not consider in detail § 409A, since it does not attempt to address the fundamental tax
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The focus has been on the corporate governance concerns posed
by deferred compensation arrangements and the Enron-specific
abuses; meanwhile a critical problem has been virtually ignored: the
federal tax rules governing executive deferred compensation are
fundamentally flawed and must be extensively overhauled. These tax
rules are flawed because they often create a significant incentive for
companies and highly paid executives to structure deferred, rather
than current, compensation,8 producing inefficient and inequitable
results.9
In this Article, we discuss potential legislative reforms that would
remedy this problem by neutralizing the tax treatment of current and

deferred compensation.

While it is relatively easy to describe in

general what such reforms would look like, the devil truly is in the

details. Tradeoffs must be made between the neutral tax treatment of
deferred compensation, on the one hand, and the practical necessity
that any reform be reasonably administrable, on the other. We
discuss the tradeoffs and suggest reforms that, in our view, best

mediate between these two oft-conflicting objectives.
We should emphasize an important point about the scope of this

Article at the outset. When we speak of "deferred compensation,"
we are referring only to those arrangements typically known as
"nonqualified"

deferred

compensation.

"Qualified"

deferred

compensation arrangements, such as 401(k) plans, provide an
intentional and explicit tax subsidy in exchange for meeting a number
of detailed conditions."l Most importantly for our purposes, there are
significant limitations on the amount that can be contributed to, or
distributed from, qualified

plans with respect to a particular

problem discussed in this Article. Instead, the legislation modestly strengthened the
preexisting tax rules in direct response to certain abuses uncovered in the fall of Enron.
See Eric D. Chason, Deferred Compensation Reform: Taxing the Fruit of the Tree in Its
ProperSeason, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 347, 349 (2006) ("Perhaps at the margin, fewer executives
and corporations will bother passing through § 409A's gates. For those who make it
through, the economics are unchanged."); Dana L. Trier, Rethinking the Taxation of
Nonqualified Deferred Compensation: Code Sec. 409A, the Hedging Regulations and Code
Sec. 1032, TAXES, Mar. 2006, at 141, 151 (noting that the legislation "appears to have been
prompted by the Joint Committee on Taxation's Report on Enron" and that, in enacting
§ 409A, "Congress left largely intact the 'symmetrical' regime of deferred compensation
... [and] failed to address fully the policy concerns inherent in such a regime").
8. See infra Part I.B.1.
9. See infra Part I.B.2.
10. See I.R.C. § 501(a) (providing that trusts meeting the requirements of § 401(a) are
exempt from taxation); id. § 401(a), amended by Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (providing the conditions for qualification as an exempt trust).
For a general discussion of qualified plans, see 3 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE
LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES, AND GIFTS T 61 (3d ed. 2001).
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employee, 1 these plans must be available to a broad spectrum of
employees, 2 and they must not "discriminate in favor of highly
compensated employees."13 These conditions make clear that, in
creating the qualified plan rules, Congress intended a limited subsidy
in favor of deferred compensation with a guarantee that the subsidy
would also benefit rank-and-file employees."4
Nonqualified
arrangements, the focus of this Article, consist of deferred
compensation arrangements that fail one or more of the qualified
plan conditions. 5 Usually, these arrangements fail as qualified
deferred compensation because they provide for employer
contributions and distributions in excess of the statutory limits, and
because they are maintained for the exclusive benefit of highly
remunerated employees.
We proceed as follows. Part I describes how current law creates
a bias in favor of deferred compensation compared with current
compensation, and then explains why this bias should be eliminated.
Part II describes two prior proposals for reform and explains that,
although the two proposals may appear to be quite different, they
really are very similar. In deconstructing these proposals, Part II
makes clear that any reform must effectively deal with the two
components of deferred compensation arrangements, the investment
yield and the compensatory element. Part III analyzes how to
formulate an appropriate tax on the investment yield. Part IV
analyzes how to account properly for the compensatory element.
I. BACKGROUND

In this Part, we illustrate how current law treatment of deferred
compensation often creates a tax bias in favor of deferred
compensation. We then explain why the policymaker's goal in
reforming the deferred compensation tax rules should be to create a
level playing field so that tax rules can be factored out of decisions
relating to the structure and timing of compensation. Finally, we
11. See I.R.C. § 415, amended by Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280,
120 Stat. 780 (setting forth these contribution and distribution limitations).
12. See id. § 410 (providing minimum participation rules intended to ensure that the
plans cover a broad spectrum of employees).
13. See id. § 401(a)(4) (prohibiting "discrimina[tion] in favor of highly compensated
employees").
14. See Bi~rKER & LOKKEN, supra note 10,
61.1.1, at 61-6 ("The policy of the
qualified plan rules can be described as one of providing a tax subsidy to all employees,
including highly paid employees and owner-employees, as a carrot to induce employers to
provide retirement benefits for rank-and-file employees.").
15. See id. T 60.1, at 60-2 to 60-3.
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explain that there is a tax bias in favor of alternative forms of
deferred compensation-specifically, restricted stock and stock

options-and analyze the effect that these alternative modes of
compensation have on the case for reforming the taxation of
nonqualified deferred compensation.
A.

CurrentLaw Treatment of Deferred Compensation

Consider the following example illustrating the tax advantages
derived from deferred compensation under current law.

Example 1. Suppose a Rabbi is an employee of the Temple
which he serves. The Rabbi is in the 40% marginal tax bracket.

In partial consideration for services to be rendered during Year
0, the governing council of the Temple gives the Rabbi a choice

between (a) a cash payment of $10,000 in Year 0 or (b) an
agreement obligating the Temple to provide a future cash
payment of $10,000 plus the investment return thereon. Under
option (b) the Rabbi (or his designee) is to be paid on his death,
disability, retirement, or termination. If the Rabbi chooses

option (b), the Temple will set aside $10,000 in a trust that will
be managed, invested, reinvested, and ultimately paid to the
Rabbi as called for by the agreement. Prior to payment, the
assets of the trust will remain subject to the claims of the

Temple's creditors. The trust assets may not be alienated or
encumbered by the Rabbi.16

Ignoring tax consequences and assuming that all of the
investment opportunities available to the Temple are also available to

the Rabbi, the Rabbi should prefer option (a). To see why, suppose
the Rabbi works for ten years before retiring and that the Trust earns
16. The taxpayer in our hypothetical is a Rabbi because, in possibly the most famous
IRS private letter ruling ever issued, the Service ruled favorably on a deferred
compensation arrangement for the benefit of a Rabbi. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-13-107
(Dec. 31, 1980). Similar arrangements are now commonly known among the tax bar as
"rabbi trust" arrangements. Trusts that qualify as rabbi trusts are effectively disregarded
for federal tax purposes, as their income is reported by the employer. See Kathryn J.
Kennedy, A Primer on the Taxation of Executive Deferred Compensation Plans, 35 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 487, 524-28 (discussing the qualification and tax consequences of
rabbi trust arrangements).
We assume that the Rabbi is given the choice between options (a) and (b) before
the year during which the services were to be performed to avoid the constructive receipt
doctrine and the strictures of I.R.C. § 409A(a)(4)(B). Section 457 imposes additional
requirements on nonqualified deferred compensation plans maintained by state and local
governments and tax exempt organizations, see I.R.C. § 457; however, certain religious
institutions, such as the Temple in this example, are specifically exempt from § 457, see id.
§ 457(e)(13).
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a compound annual return of 7.2%. During the interval between
Years 0 and 10, the $10,000 trust corpus will have grown to $20,000.17
By hypothesis, the Rabbi could have earned a 7.2% return himself for
those ten years had he chosen option (a), in which case he would have
netted the same $20,000. By doing so, he would avoid the risk that
the Trust assets might be seized by the Temple's creditors.
Furthermore, the Rabbi would have ready access to the funds during
the period of deferral, liquidity that would have been denied him
under option (b).
When taxes are considered, the result is starkly different. Under
current law, the trust's income is attributed to the Temple, 8 which is
tax exempt; 19 the Rabbi will not have to report the income until he
receives it. 0 Consequently, the aftertax investment opportunities
available to the Temple are much better than those available to the
Rabbi. If the pretax yield on the investment of choice is 7.2%, then
the Temple's aftertax yield will be 7.2%, whereas the Rabbi's aftertax
yield will be only 4.3% (7.2% reduced by the Rabbi's 40% marginal
tax rate). This means that option (b) is far superior to option (a), 2 ' as
shown in the following table.

17. $10,000 x (1 + 7.177%)"o = $20,000.

18. See Treas. Reg. § 1.677(a)-1(d) (2006).
19. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (exempting religious organizations from tax).
20. The Service will not attempt to apply either the economic benefit doctrine or the
constructive receipt doctrine in the case of an unfunded, unsecured promise to pay, like
the one in Example 1, see Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174, and such "unfunded and
unsecured" promises are expressly not subject to I.R.C. § 83. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e).
Furthermore, this arrangement is not subject to the limitations on deferred compensation
plans of state and local governments and tax exempt organizations under I.R.C. § 457
given that church plans are excepted. See I.R.C. § 457(e)(13). The circumstances where
deferral of the employee's tax liability is possible were narrowed by the American Jobs
Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418, but none of the impediments to
deferral added by the new law are implicated in this example. See I.R.C. § 409A.
21. Option (b) is clearly superior disregarding the risk of default by the Temple and
the cost to the Rabbi of illiquidity during the deferral period. To perform a complete
analysis, the Rabbi would have to consider these implicit costs and weigh them against the
$2,853 incremental aftertax income he receives in Year 10 under option (b). Typically,
default risk and illiquidity do not impose significant costs on employees who participate in
deferred compensation arrangements.
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Table 1. Comparison of Current and Deferred Compensation
When Employee's Investment Yield is Taxed, but Emplover's is Not
A. Year 0 Payment

Option (a)
Pmt. to Rabbi
$10,000

Option (b)
Pint. to Trust
$10,000
a

B. Rabbi's Tax (A x .4)

$4,000

$0

C. Year 0 Net (A - B)

$6,000

$10,000

D. Investment Yield

$3 ,1 4 7 b

$10,000c

E. Year 10 Net (C + D)
F. Rabbi's Tax (E x .4)
G. Year 10 Net (E - F)

$9,147
$0 d
$9,147

$20,000
$8,000
$12,000

a. No payment was received by the Rabbi in Year 0, so no tax is due. See
supra note 20 and accompanying text.
b. The investment grows at 4.3%, the aftertax rate available to the Rabbi.
c. The investment grows at 7.2%, the aftertax rate available to the Temple.
d. Income tax was paid on receipt of compensation in Year 0, so no tax is due
in Year 10.

The superiority of option (b) is solely attributable to the higher
aftertax rate of return available to the Temple as compared with the
Rabbi. It has nothing to do with deferral or acceleration of the
Rabbi's obligation to pay taxes due on receipt of the compensation.
Tax deferral is not advantageous to the Rabbi if the amount of tax
due following the period of deferral is adjusted to account for the

time value of money, as it is here. 2
Example 1 is an extreme case, given that the Temple's
investment income is tax exempt and the Rabbi's is fully taxable. In
less extreme cases-cases in which the employer is subject to a lower

rate of tax than the employee because, for instance, the statutory rate
applicable to the employer is lower or the employer is eligible for

certain tax preferences for which the employee is not-the benefit of
22. Under option (a), the Rabbi receives $10,000 currently, so the tax due is $4,000.
Under option (b), the Rabbi receives $20,000 in Year 10, so the tax due is $8,000, which
has a Present value of $4,000 when discounted at the pretax rate of return. $8,000 / (1 +
7.2%)O = $4,000. Usually intertemporal comparisons are made by discounting at the
aftertax rate of return available to the taxpayer; here, by selecting option (b), the Rabbi
avoids tax on the investment yield, so the Rabbi's aftertax rate of return is the same as the
pretax rate. Thus discounting at 7.2% is appropriate in this example.
From the government's perspective, deferring tax on the compensatory element
effectively amounts to a loan of the tax liability deferred. Whether the government
benefits by this arrangement depends on how the government's borrowing rate compares
to the market rate. Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the "Time Value of
Money," 95 YALE L.J. 506, 531-32 (1986). Assuming, as is likely, that the government
generally borrows at a lower rate than taxpayers can earn on invested funds, and ignoring
the risk that the taxpayer may default, the government would gain by borrowing funds at
the government rate to lend to the Rabbi. Id.
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deferral is reduced, but it is not eliminated. The tax subsidy for
deferred compensation when the employer's investment income is
more lightly taxed than the employee's can only be eliminated if the
tax rate applied to investment income earned on deferred
compensation is set equal to the rate that would have applied had the
deferred compensation been paid currently and the employee had
made the investment directly.23
It is worth noting that under current law, the top marginal rate
for most players in the deferred compensation game-large public
companies and their highly paid executives-are the same.24 This
historically anomalous symmetry lessens somewhat the urgency of
reform (and might also lessen interest group resistance to reform,
making this a propitious time for reform proposals). The benefits of
reform are still significant, however, even when tax rates are
symmetrical.
The tax base for individuals and corporations is
different (e.g., because of the dividends-received deduction). In
addition, corporations or individuals may have net operating loss
carryovers or capital loss carryovers. Accordingly, effective marginal
tax rates may be vastly different even when, as now, statutory rates
are the same.
B.

Neutrality as the Policy Goal
1. Defining Neutrality

Academics and government officials agree that the central goal
in reforming the deferred compensation tax rules should be to
neutralize the tax treatment of current and deferred compensation.25

23. If the employer's investment income is taxed at a higher rate than the employee's
investment income, paying deferred compensation is disadvantageous. In such a
circumstance, the employee would choose to be paid currently (option (a)).
24. Compare I.R.C. § 1(i)(2) (providing for a maximum marginal tax rate of 35% for
individuals for taxable years beginning after 2003) with I.R.C. § 11(b)(1) (providing for a
maximum marginal tax of 35% for corporations).
25. See Halperin, supra note 22, at 541 (proposing a "special tax on investment
income" to eliminate the "unwarranted and unintended subsidy to high-income
individuals" under current law); MICHAEL DORAN, URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX POLICY
CTR., DISCUSSION PAPER No. 18:
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION REFORM AND THE
LIMITS OF TAX POLICY 1 (2004), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/

311113 TPCdp18.pdf ("The proper tax policy goal [is] strict neutrality between current
and deferred compensation."); Enron Investigation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Finance, 108th Cong. 1 (2003) (statement of Pamela F. Olson, Assistant Sec'y, Tax Policy,
U.S. Dep't of the Treasury), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js168.htm
("[W]e recommend that Congress legislate directly rather than indirectly by trying to
influence corporate governance and accountability decisions through the tax code. The
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Commentators and policymakers have spoken and written about
neutrality as though it is an unambiguous and self-defining concept.26
This viewpoint is frequently justified, though not always. In the
deferred compensation context, neutrality is generally gauged by
comparing (a) the aggregate tax liabilities of the employee and the
employer (adjusted to account for the time value of money) given a
program of deferred compensation with (b) the tax liabilities of the
same employee and the same employer (again, adjusted for the time
value of money) given current compensation followed by a direct
investment by the employee in whatever asset is necessary to put the
employee in the same economic position she would have occupied
had she bargained for deferred compensation. Neutrality is properly
evaluated by examining the aggregate impact of the deferred
compensation rules on the tax positions of both the employee and
employer. Rules that appear to overtax the employee might actually
be neutral if they undertax the employer by the same amount, and
vice versa. The key point here is that the side of the compensation
arrangement on which a tax burden is imposed or a tax benefit is
conferred is irrelevant when evaluating the economic burden of the
tax, since the parties can adjust the nominal pretax compensation to
shift the tax benefits and burdens between themselves. 7 If the
aggregate tax liability of the parties is the same under (a) and (b), the
system is neutral; otherwise it is not.2
Applying this standard is straightforward when there is only one
nondeferred compensation transaction that can reasonably serve as
the standard for comparison when gauging neutrality. But when
there are two (or more) nondeferred compensation transactions that
would allow the parties to replicate the economic results they would
have achieved through deferred compensation, the analysis may
become more difficult.
If these alternative nondeferred
compensation transactions are taxed alike then either (or both) of the
tax code should be neutral. If it is not, it is likely to influence or skew decisionmaking one
way or the other with unfortunate unintended consequences.").
26. See supra note 25.
27. See JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 519-27 (2005)
("[T]he side of the market on which the tax is imposed is irrelevant to the distribution of
the tax burden."); Michael S. Knoll, The Tax Efficiency of Stock-Based Compensation, 103
TAX NOTES 203, 208 (2004) ("Whether a compensation mechanism is tax efficient should
be determined from a joint contracting perspective rather than the employer's or
employee's perspective alone.").
28. This definition of neutrality is the same as the one used in Merton H. Miller &
Myron S. Scholes, Executive Compensation, Taxes and Incentives, in FINANCIAL
ECONOMICS:

ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PAUL COOTNER 179, 184-85 (William Sharpe &

Cathryn Cootner eds., 1982).
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transactions can reasonably serve as the neutral standard. It is often
the case, however, that investments-in particular, transactions
involving financial products of the type implicated by this analysisare taxed inconsistently, 9 or that the tax treatment of one or more of
In such cases, a
the alternative investments is indeterminate.30
definition of neutrality that depends on matching the aftertax results
of current compensation followed by a direct investment ultimately
begs the question: Which of the alternative transactions should factor
into the neutrality analysis?
Suppose, for example, that an employer is compensating its
employee by promising her a future payment dependent on the
employer's stock price. Suppose that, in lieu of a $100 current salary
payment, the employer promises to pay its employee in three years
the value at that time of an amount of its stock that could be
purchased today for $100 (say 100 shares). This type of arrangement
is typically called a "phantom stock plan."'" One way to view the
nondeferred compensation analogue to this transaction is to imagine
that the employer pays the employee $100, and the employee then
uses the net-of-tax salary to purchase $65 worth of employer stock
(sixty-five shares) from the employer. Under this scenario, the
employer would get a $100 deduction for the salary payment (and the
employer's stock sale to the employee would not be taxed to the
employer) .32
Another alternative would be to view the employer as paying the
employee $100, and the employee as loaning her $65 net-of-tax salary
to the employer for three years at a market rate of interest. To
account for the employer stock-based aspect of the deferred
compensation arrangement, the employer would be seen as selling a
forward contract on its own stock to the employee. Under this
scenario, the employer would get a $100 deduction for the salary
29. See, e.g., infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text (providing an example of

inconsistent taxation).
30. See, e.g., infra notes 167-70 and accompanying text (describing how the taxation
of a nondeferred compensation analogue depends on the uncertain application of I.R.C.

§ 163(l)).
31. See A. Thomas Brisendine et al., Deferred Compensation Arrangements, Tax
Mgmt. Portfolio (BNA) No. 383, at A-6 (2002).
32. I.R.C. § 1032 (2000). It appears at first that the employer has a different number
of shares outstanding in the phantom stock plan (100 shares) than in the analogous
nondeferred compensation transaction (sixty-five shares). If true, this would suggest that

the two transactions are not analogous, precluding a meaningful comparison. However
the employer paying phantom stock has an inchoate deduction that is worth thirty-five
shares; considering the value of this deduction it has sixty-five shares outstanding in the
phantom stock plan alternative on a net basis.
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payment and an interest deduction for the three year employee-toemployer loan. Conversely, the employee would have $100 of
compensation income plus income from interest accruals on the
employee-to-employer loan.33

Which of the two nondeferred compensation analogues should
serve as the neutral standard? There is a strong argument that the
benchmark should be whichever alternative results in the lowest
overall tax burden. As a' first approximation, it is reasonable to
assume that the parties will act in their mutual best interest by
structuring their compensation contracts to minimize the present
value of their aggregate tax liability. This implies that the appropriate
standard is the latter transaction in cases where the employer's
marginal tax rate exceeds the employee's, because the present value
of the employer's incremental interest deductions will exceed the
corresponding interest income taxed to the employee.
This conclusion is, however, objectionable at some level. If the
employer's sale of a forward contract on its own stock and its
borrowing are aggregated, it is as though the employer is effectively
deducting dividend payments on its own stock, 3 a result that is
inappropriate in a classical corporate income tax system that respects
the debt-equity distinction. Nevertheless, taxpayers enter into very
similar transactions outside, of the deferred compensation context,
and the tax treatment of these transactions has been validated,
subject to elaborate safeguards, by a revenue ruling.35 If the more
aggressive transaction is objectionable because of fidelity to the debtequity distinction, then the issue is not specific to deferred
compensation; rather, it lies at the crossroads of corporate taxation
and the taxation of financial instruments.36
To sum up, in many, perhaps most, cases the presence or absence
of neutrality will be uncontroversial. At the same time, however,
neutrality as we have defined it presupposes that policymakers can
identify a single nondeferred compensation analogue to the
transaction in question and achieve neutrality by matching the tax
33. Settlement of the forward contract would not be taxable to the employer, id.
§ 1032, but the employee would realize gain or loss when the contract settles in three
years. See 2 BORIS I. BITKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF
INCOME, ESTATES, AND GIFTS 57.3.1. (3d ed. 2001).
34. DAVID C. GARLOCK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF DEBT INSTRUMENTS

§ 9.09[B] (4th ed. 2000).
35. Id.; Rev. Rul. 2003-97, 2003-2 C.B. 380.
36. See, e.g., Alvin C. Warren, Jr., US Income Taxation of New FinancialProducts, 88
J. OF PUB. ECON. 899, 904. (2004) (exploring how financial innovation undermines formal
distinctions in the tax law, including the debt-equity distinction).
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As we have shown, this is not
treatment of that transaction.
necessarily true.37 Specifically, it is false when the alternative
analogues up for consideration as the neutral standard are taxed in an
inconsistent fashion. In such cases, it is not always clear what
neutrality means.
We do not want to overstate the difficulties that are caused by a
definition of neutrality that cannot be applied with precision in all
cases. Even when it is difficult or impossible conclusively to resolve
which potential nondeferred compensation analogue should serve as
the standard for neutrality, it is still possible to identify deferred
compensation tax reforms that promote (or defeat) neutrality. For
instance, where a proposed change would decrease the disparity
between the tax treatment of deferred compensation on the one
hand, and the relevant set of nondeferred compensation analogues on
the other hand, policymakers can confidently conclude that the
proposed change is neutrality enhancing, even without settling on a
single nondeferred compensation analogue to employ as the neutral
standard.
2. The Benefits of Neutrality
Nonneutral tax treatment of deferred compensation is
undesirable for two reasons: it is inefficient and inequitable. To
illustrate the inefficiency, suppose that in a no-tax world, the Rabbi in
Example 1 would prefer to be paid currently and that the Rabbi
values his preference at $100. So long as the deferred compensation
saves taxes in excess of $100, the Rabbi will forsake his preference to
be paid currently, opting instead for deferred compensation, because
this will maximize his well being. Suppose that by opting for deferred
rather than current compensation, the Rabbi saves taxes with a
present value of $110. The Rabbi is better off by $10, the excess of
the tax savings over the value of the forsaken preference.
Society, however, is worse off. The $110 of taxes that the Rabbi
avoided would have imposed no direct burden on society provided
the government would have spent the $110 to provide services or
transfer payments worth $110. The tax would merely have caused a
redistribution from the Rabbi to the government and ultimately to
recipients of government services or transfer payments. But by
causing the Rabbi to change his behavior, the tax imposes a
substantial indirect cost-namely, the value of the Rabbi's forsaken

37. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
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preference. This indirect cost, or deadweight loss, is the efficiency
cost of nonneutral tax treatment of deferred compensation.38

The inequity of nonneutral tax treatment of deferred
compensation stems from its distributional effects. Nonqualified
deferred compensation is provided almost exclusively to highly paid
employees.3 9 Rank-and-file employees earning low or moderate
salaries are seldom offered the opportunity to be paid deferred

compensation. Thus, to the extent tax rules favor nonqualified
deferred compensation, they appear, to "provide an unwarranted and
unintended subsidy to high-income individuals.

40

38. Deadweight loss results whenever nonneutral tax rules induce taxpayers to change
their behavior. See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 291-312 (4th ed. 1984). Thus if the Rabbi had a preference
for deferred compensation and current compensation was sufficiently tax preferred to
induce the Rabbi to accept current compensation, deadweight loss would result.
This extremely simple exposition of deadweight loss from nonneutral taxation
overlooks the (ever-present) inefficiency that results from a tax on labor income, which
causes taxpayers to substitute leisure (which cannot practically be taxed) for work. The
labor-leisure tradeoff can be factored out of discussions of the inefficiency caused by
nonneutral taxation of labor income if one assumes (as we have) that labor income will
bear tax in some form. Ignoring the inefficiency that results from the choice to tax labor
income allows us to focus on the margins that are relevant when formulating rules for the
taxation of labor income-(a) the margin between current and deferred compensation,
and (b) the margin between equity-based compensation and non-equity-based
compensation. For a more rigorous treatment of deadweight loss, see HARVY S. ROSEN,
PUBLIC FINANCE 282-305 (6th ed. 2002). For an argument that efficiency can and should
be used in formulating tax rules to draw lines between formally distinct transactions that
are close substitutes for one another-such as current and deferred compensation-see
David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine,and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL
L. REV. 1627, 1679 (1999).
39. Employers, rather than employees, might capture some or all of the tax benefit by
paying employees accepting deferred compensation a lower pretax amount. See Gregg D.
Polsky & Brant J. Hellwig, Taxing the Promise To Pay, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1092, 1146-47
(2005). If so, this would blunt the inequity. How the tax benefit resulting from deferred
compensation is shared between the parties is a function of their bargain. For a
provocative argument that when setting executive pay, boards of directors and executives
do not bargain at arm's length, see generally BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 4.
40. Halperin, supra note 22, at 541. There is a congressional policy, embodied in the
qualified plan nondiscrimination rules, that tax favored retirement plans be made
available to a broad group of individuals in different income cohorts, I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(4),
(5), 410(b) (2000), and that such tax favored retirement benefits be limited in amount, id.
§ 415. The nondiscrimination rules and maximum benefit limit do not restrict
nonqualified deferred compensation plans; accordingly, nonqualified deferred
compensation plans appear to "undermine[]" congressional policy. Halperin, supra note
22, at 539-41.
It is possible that Congress's policy preferences have shifted over time and that it
was more politically expedient to permit nonqualified deferred compensation to flourish
as a backdoor rate cut for the highly compensated than to repeal the nondiscrimination
rules and maximum benefit limit (or, more generally, to alter the rate structure). In other
words, the rules governing both qualified and nonqualified deferred compensation, taken
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Goals other than efficiency and equity are often promoted
through tax policy. There may be legitimate arguments that deferred
compensation should be tax preferred relative to current
compensation. For example, one could argue that a tax preference
for deferred compensation helps startup companies attract and retain
employees, which is good for society as it promotes economic growth
and innovation. Deferred compensation may also help solve agency
problems, for instance, by bonding employees to their employers-as
where the deferred compensation is subject to forfeiture-or by
aligning managers' financial fortunes with those of the shareholdersas where the deferred compensation is in the form of employer stock.
We do not pass on the validity of these arguments.4' Instead, like the
other commentators who have written on this subject, our goal is to
explore how current and deferred compensation can be taxed
neutrally, to minimize the inefficiency and inequity that results from
tax-driven compensation arrangements.
C. Deferred Compensation Alternatives-RestrictedStock and Stock
Options
All of the deferred compensation arrangements we have
described thus far are unfunded, unsecured promises to pay future
compensation.
Such unfunded, unsecured promises are not
considered property for purposes of § 83,42 the rule that requires
service providers to pay tax on the receipt of in-kind property
transfers in exchange for services rendered.4 3 Were there only two
together, might embody a deliberate (though nontransparent) congressional policy rather
than an "unintended subsidy," Halperin, supra note 22, at 541, although it is impossible to

say for sure.
41. We note, though, that empirical research casts a pall on claims that corporate
governance goals can effectively be achieved through tax rules. See, e.g., Nancy L. Rose &
Catherine Wolfram, Regulating Executive Pay: Using the Tax Code To Influence CEO
Compensation 23 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7842, 2000)
(concluding that the $1 million cap on deductions for executive compensation has had
"relatively little real impact on overall compensation").
Furthermore, if Congress wants to use tax rules to implement nontax policies, it
could do so in a more targeted fashion. For instance, if the desire is to subsidize start-up
companies, current law treatment of deferred compensation is a poor policy choice since
the subsidy it affords is not restricted to start-ups. In addition, many nontax business goals

associated with deferred compensation

can be achieved outside of the deferred

compensation context. For instance, if the employer's goal is to facilitate employee
ownership of company stock, employers could pay cash and impose contractual
obligations on employees to procure such stock. Fostering employee stock ownership via
deferred compensation tax rules is not the only alternative.

42. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (2006).
43. See I.R.C. § 83(a).
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relevant forms of compensation-current compensation and
nonqualified deferred compensation excepted from § 83-the
neutrality argument for equalizing their tax treatment would be
unassailable."
Unfunded, unsecured promises are not, however, the only form
of compensation received in exchange for services that is eligible for
preferential tax treatment.
Property interests (including an
employer's funded or secured promise) that are both unvested and
nontransferable are not currently taxed.4 5

We will refer to this

alternative category of deferred compensation as "§ 83 deferred
compensation." As noted, this Article is primarily about the taxation
of nonqualified deferred compensation-i.e., unfunded, unsecured
promises-but the presence of § 83 deferred compensation
complicates the question whether reforming the taxation of
nonqualified deferred compensation is worthwhile.

A reform that

eliminates an inconsistency between the tax treatment of current
compensation and nonqualified deferred compensation may create a

new (or exacerbate an existing) inconsistency between nonqualified
deferred compensation and § 83 deferred compensation. It is not
clear whether the tax system would be improved by trading one

inconsistency for another.

We consider this issue below, after

illustrating the tax advantage gained by remunerating employees with
§ 83 deferred compensation.46
1. The Tax Advantage of § 83 Deferred Compensation

Suppose an employer transfers employer stock to its employee,
subject to the condition that if the employee leaves the company at
44. As we discuss above, qualified deferred compensation is tax-advantaged, as are
fringe benefits excluded from income under § 132, but since taxpayers' ability to exploit
these forms of tax advantaged compensation is quite limited, they are not reasonable
alternatives to the forms of tax-favored compensation we do discuss, and are thus
irrelevant at the margin. See supra Part I.
45. See I.R.C. § 83(a).
46. Although § 83 technically applies to compensatory transfers of any property
interest (other than an unfunded, unsecured promise to pay), we limit our discussion
below to transfers of the employer's stock and stock options. We do this because, as a
practical matter, deferred compensation subject to § 83 is nearly always stock-based. If
the employer were to take the unusual step of transferring unvested property other than
its own stock or stock options, the analysis below would change substantially. Under
current law, when the non-stock-based property vests, the employer must recognize gain
or loss to the extent the fair market value of the property (determined at the time of
vesting) differs from the employer's basis. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-6(b). This gain or loss
recognition does not occur in stock-based § 83 deferred compensation because of § 1032,
which provides for nonrecognition when a corporation transfers its own stock or stock
options.
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any time within the next three years the stock will be forfeited-an
arrangement commonly referred to as restricted stock. This is not
merely an unfunded promise given that the employer has actually
transferred property to the employee.
Under current law, the
employee owes no tax until the condition lapses-that is, until the
shares vest.47 On vesting, the employee will owe tax on the "bargain
element"-the excess of the fair market value of the shares when they
vest over the amount paid for the shares (which is zero in this
example, as the employee paid nothing for the shares).4 8 Critically,
the employee's basis in the shares will equal her taxable income when
the shares vest, as if the employer paid her the cash value of the
shares when they vested, and the employee used the cash to purchase
vested shares, establishing a cost basis. Consider the following
example.
Example 2. An employer transfers 100 shares of restricted
stock worth $100 to an employee at the beginning of Year 1.
The shares appreciate to $150 by the time they vest at the end
of Year 3. The employee owes tax on $150 of income when the
shares vest in Year 3-the excess of the shares' value on vesting
($150) over the price paid ($O)-and takes a $150 basis in the
shares. If the employee sells the shares on the day they vest,
then assuming a marginal tax rate of 35%, the employee will
net $97.50 ($150 - ($150 x 35%)).
Had the employer in Example 2 paid cash at the outset, rather
than issuing restricted stock, the employee would have been worse off
considering the tax consequences. She would have netted $65 when
the cash salary was paid ($100 - (100 x 35%)). If she invested this $65
in employer stock it would have grown to $97.50 over the same three
year period (the stock appreciated by 50% between Years 1 and 3, so
sixty-five shares would be worth $97.50 at the end of Year 3). If the
employee sold the shares for $97.50 she would net $92.63 ($97.50 ($97.50 - $65) x 15%)). The employee's aftertax wealth on the sale of
her shares in this non-§ 83 alternative is $4.87 lower because she has a
lower stock basis when she purchases the shares with her cash
compensation (that is, the difference is attributable to the inferior
basis results that occur when the share purchase occurs outside of
§ 83). Arguably the superior results for unvested compensation for
which § 83 defers taxation is justified on the ground that the
employee has not "earned" the compensation until vesting. In this
47. I.R.C. § 83(a).
48. Id.
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view, the two transactions just compared are not comparable. It is
easy to make too much of this point, however. In practice, vesting
conditions "may really be little more than legal 'boilerplate' to meet
the letter of" § 83, while the actual agreement, shorn of the vesting
conditions, is governed by implicit contracts or informal
understandings.49 On the other hand, in circumstances where vesting
conditions are bona fide, deferred taxation under § 83 is justifiable,
even if not unambiguously correct, as a policy matter.
Nonqualified stock options ("NQSOs") are another common
form of § 83 deferred compensation. 0 Although a compensatory
transfer by an employer to its employee of a stock option is within the
terms of § 83(a), suggesting the bargain element is subject to tax when
NQSOs vest, NQSOs are excepted from § 83(a), unless they have a
readily ascertainable fair market value, which is extraordinarily rare.51
NQSOs lacking a readily ascertainable value are excluded from
§ 83(a) because, if they were included, it would be necessary to value
the options to compute the bargain element subject to tax, and a
judgment was made that valuing NQSOs is prohibitively difficult in
most cases.52 Thus, under current law, an employee in receipt of an
NQSO has no taxable income until exercise of the NQSO, and at that
time has taxable income equal to the value of the stock received on
exercise less the price paid for the stock; the employer is entitled to a
deduction equal to the employee's taxable income. Upon disposition
of the stock purchased on exercise of the option the employee's gain
(or loss) is determined by reference to the stock's value on the date
the option is exercised, since the employee's basis will equal fair
market value on that date. This regime confers a benefit on the
employee when compared with an analogous transaction not
excluded from § 83. The benefit is roughly analogous to the benefit
obtained from a restricted stock plan versus cash compensation, as
described above.53 That is, inside a NQSO plan, on the employee's
disposition of the optioned shares, no tax would be due on the

49. See Miller and Scholes, supra note 28, at 191 & n.16.
50. The moniker "nonqualified stock options" is used to distinguish such options from
incentive stock options (sometimes called statutory or qualified stock options) that are
taxed under §§ 421-422. Incentive stock options are usually tax inefficient; accordingly we
do not focus on this form of compensation.
51. I.R.C. § 83(e)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(b).
52. This judgment is reflected in the regulations. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(b); see BITrKER
& LOKKEN, supra note 10, 60.5.2.
53. See Miller & Scholes, supra note 28, at 193-94; Knoll, supra note 27, at 213.
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appreciation in the value of the company's stock between the date the
option is granted and the date it is exercised. 4
2. Is Reform Worth the Trouble?
Is reforming the tax treatment of nonqualified deferred
compensation to eliminate the inconsistency between current
compensation and nonqualified deferred compensation worth the
trouble if § 83 deferred compensation is still taxed preferentially? We
begin to answer this question by asking another: Is § 83 deferred
compensation an immutable feature of our tax system? (This might
be the case, for instance, if the current tax treatment of § 83 deferred
compensation is the best way to handle difficult problems of
valuation, the resulting nonneutrality notwithstanding.) If the answer
to this second question is no, then the optimal solution may be to
reform both nonqualified deferred compensation and § 83 deferred
compensation to bring the tax treatment of both in line with current
compensation (and with each other). If the answer to this second
question is yes, on the other hand, then the argument in favor of
reforming the taxation of nonqualified deferred compensation is
weakened, at least to the extent that the reform is justified by the
resulting gains in efficiency and fairness, though the case for
reforming the taxation of nonqualified deferred compensation may
still be supportable on other grounds."
The second question-whether § 83 is an immutable feature of
our tax system-is not amenable to a simple yes or no answer. It is
likely that the taxation of restricted stock, to take one prominent
form of § 83 deferred compensation, could be reformed to eliminate
the tax preference identified above. 6 An extreme approach to
reforming the taxation of restricted stock would be to require the
employee to include the unvested stock in income (and to permit the
employer a deduction) when the stock is transferred, rather than
when it vests. Under such an approach, if the employee ultimately
forfeits the unvested property because a vesting condition is not
54. See infra note 59 for a more complete explanation of the tax benefits derived from
NQSOs that lack a readily ascertainable fair market value.
55. Other arguments for reforming the taxation of nonqualified deferred
compensation may not depend on fairness or efficiency. For instance, it could be argued
that accrual taxation of nonqualified deferred compensation is desirable because it is more
consistent with the Haig-Simons definition of income. For a rebuttal of this and similar
arguments in another context, see David A. Weisbach, Reconsidering the Accrual of
Interest Income, TAXES, Mar. 2000, at 36, 40-43.

56. As noted, different tax treatment of unvested § 83 deferred compensation may be
justified at least in certain cases. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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satisfied, the employee should be allowed a deduction (and the
employer should have to include in income the amount of its prior
compensation deduction), to correct the inclusion and deduction that
proved, in hindsight, to have been unwarranted.5 7 A less extreme
approach to reforming the taxation of restricted stock would be to

allow the employee to defer her compensation income (and to require
the employer to defer its deduction) until the property vests-as

under current law-but to require the employee to pay tax on any
price appreciation in the property that occurs between the date of the
(unvested) property transfer and the date the employee's rights in the
property vest.5"
On the other hand, it is unlikely that an administrable set of rules
could be formulated to tax all forms of § 83 deferred compensation on

par with current compensation.

NQSOs are the most important

example. To design rules to negate the tax benefit afforded NQSOs
under current law, policymakers would first be required to quantify
that benefit. Unfortunately, the benefit depends in part on the grantdate value of the option. The perceived difficulty in ascertaining this
information is the very reason that NQSOs are excepted from § 83(a)

in the first place.59 Recent changes to the accounting rules governing
the treatment of stock-based compensation, including stock options,
require firms to estimate and expense the fair value of stock-based

compensation, suggesting the possibility that accounting valuations
could be used for tax purposes. The malleability of the accounting
57. Because of the time value of money, reversing the employee's income with a later
deduction (and the employer's deduction with later income) would be an imperfect
solution, though the resulting benefit to the employer should offset the detriment to the
employee, at least in part, depending on the parties' marginal tax rates and the rate of
inflation.
58. This could be accomplished by setting the employee's basis according to the value
of the restricted stock on the date it is transferred, rather than the date it vests.
59. As described above, inside a NQSO plan, on the employee's disposition of the
optioned shares, no tax would be due on the appreciation in the value of the company's
stock between the date the option is granted and the date it is exercised. See supra text
accompanying note 54. For comparison, suppose that outside a NQSO plan, an employee
were paid in cash and invested in an option with the same characteristics as the NQSO.
On the employee's disposition of the optioned shares, tax would be due on the excess of
the sale proceeds over the sum of (a) the amount paid for the option and (b) the amount
paid for the stock on option exercise.
Thus, if the shares have appreciated between the time the option was granted and
the time it was exercised, the taxpayer does better inside the NQSO plan than outside the
plan. The difficulty is that it is not possible to determine how much better, unless one
knows how much the option would be worth had the employee purchased it rather than
received it in exchange for services. Establishing a reliable value for an analogous option
outside of the NQSO plan is a formidable task absent a market for comparable options,
which seldom exists in practice.
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valuation rules, however, make them a poor guide for assessing
taxes.60

In sum, we think the answer to the question whether § 83 is an
immutable feature of our tax system is a qualified yes. 61 The class of
transactions eligible for the benefit of afforded § 83 deferred
compensation could be constricted without undue administrative
hardships to exclude, for example, restricted stock. It is questionable,
however, whether an administrable alternative to the wait-and-see
approach § 83 adopts with respect to other property-principally
NQSOs-could be reasonably implemented.62
If we are correct that comprehensive § 83 reform is infeasibleor if there is no political appetite for such reform even if it is
feasible-it takes us back to the question whether eliminating one
inconsistency is worth it if it means creating another one. In the end
this depends on how taxpayers would respond to such a reform, an
empirical question which, in turn, depends on how readily taxpayers
will substitute one form of compensation for another.
If most taxpayers would continue using nonqualified deferred
compensation despite the elimination of the tax preference, or if they
would switch to current compensation, then the reform would have
succeeded in eliminating an important tax distortion between these
60. See Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123 (revised 2004), FIN.
SERIES, Dec. 2004, at 1, http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas123r.pdf.
Studies have
demonstrated that different, yet equally acceptable, accounting valuation methodologies
can produce wildly disparate fair value estimates. See, e.g., Maribeth Coller & Julia L.
Higgs, Firm Valuation and Accounting for Employee Stock Options, FIN. ANALYSTS J.,
Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 26, 26-34. The basic problem is that option valuation depends on the
expected volatility of the underlying security during the term of the option which must be
estimated. FASB 123R "does not specify a method of estimating expected volatility;
rather [it] provides a list of factors that should be considered in estimating expected
volatility," and suggests that that firms' estimates of expected volatility "should be
reasonable and supportable."
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123
(revised 2004), supra, at 48. For a discussion of the problems that may result if the tax
treatment of an item is based on its financial accounting treatment, see Linda M. Beale,
Book-Tax Conformity and the Corporate Tax Shelter Debate: Assessing the Proposed
Section 475 Mark-to-Market Safe Harbor,24 VA. TAX REV. 301, 355-59 (2004).
61. For further discussion of this issue, see Trier, supra note 7, at 178 (discussing the
possibility of reforming the tax treatment of stock-based nonqualified deferred
compensation and concluding that the issue merits further study).
62. One alternative to the current rule that provides, in essence, that absent a public
market in employee stock options, they cannot be valued, see Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(b)
(2006), would be a rule that assigns to such options a value skewed to the high side, unless
taxpayers can justify a different valuation based on an active market. Rather than
structuring employee stock options to avoid the possibility of ready valuation, which is the
common strategy under current law, taxpayers would have an incentive to issue NQSOs
with terms similar or identical to exchange-traded options, which would resolve the
difficult valuation issue.

Accr.
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two forms of compensation and the apparent unfairness to taxpayers
choosing the tax-inefficient alternative (cash compensation). But if
many taxpayers using nonqualified deferred compensation would
respond to tax reform by switching to § 83 deferred compensation,
then the benefit of eliminating an inconsistency at the margin
between current and deferred compensation would be muted (and
might even be negated).
Although the presence of § 83 deferred compensation as an
alternative to nonqualified deferred compensation casts some doubt
on whether reforming nonqualified deferred compensation is
worthwhile, leading members of the academy, and government
officials, nevertheless support reform.6 3 For the balance of this
Article we too will accept the common wisdom that reform is
worthwhile and will explore how such reform should be implemented.
II. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

In this Part we discuss the leading proposals for reforming the
taxation of nonqualified deferred compensation. Very generally, a
deferred compensation tax regime must specify three things: (1) the
timing and rate of the tax on the investment yield generated by the
deferred compensation; (2) the timing of the employee's inclusion of
the compensatory element of the deferred payment; and (3) the
timing of the employer's deduction of this compensatory element.
For instance, as illustrated above, current law (1) taxes the investment
yield generated by deferred compensation to the employer at the
employer's applicable rate when the income is reportable by the
employer under its method of accounting,' 4 (2) requires the employee
to report the compensatory element when (actually or constructively)
received, and (3) permits the employer a compensation deduction
when the employee reports compensation income (this third element
was not developed in Example 1 because the Temple was tax exempt
so the deduction has no value, which will not generally be the case).65
The two primary reform proposals that have been floated are
quite similar-perhaps more similar than observers appreciate-in
63. See supra note 25.
64. For example, the investment income generated by a deferred compensation
arrangement (like the trust in Example 1) is taxed exactly the same as such income would
be taxed to the employer in the absence of a deferred compensation arrangement. Cf.
I.R.C. § 501(a) (2000) (exempting from taxation the investment income generated by a
qualified deferred compensation arrangement).
65. BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 10, 60.2, at 831-49, (describing taxation of
deferred compensation under current law).
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that they both rectify the shortcoming of current law by imposing tax
on the investment yield generated by deferred compensation at a rate
closer to the rate that would have applied had the employee invested
directly for her own account throughout the period of deferral.
(Some of the particulars of the tax on the investment yield differ
The primary
between the two proposals, as detailed below.)
difference between the two proposals is that one would perpetuate
current law by allowing the employee to defer inclusion (and require
the employer to defer deduction) of the compensatory element of the
payment, whereas the other would accelerate both the employee's
inclusion and the employer's deduction. As we demonstrate, both
proposals have the potential to substantially improve neutrality, given
that the timing of the inclusion and deduction of the compensatory
element (as well as the timing of the tax on investment yield) is not
important provided amounts are properly adjusted to account for the
time value of money. Timing is, however, important for reasons of tax
administration. Our central claim is that the ideal reform proposal is
the one that deals with the three elements in a way that best promotes
neutrality in a reasonably administrable manner.
A.

Special Tax on Investment Income

In his 1986 article Interest in Disguise: Taxing the "Time Value of
Money," Professor Daniel Halperin argued that a special tax should
be imposed on investment income generated by nonqualified
deferred compensation.6 6 The amount of the special tax would be
computed as if the investment income had been earned by the
employee directly, although the employer would be responsible for
remitting the tax.67
Halperin's proposal effectively taxes the
employer on the investment income generated by deferred
compensation as if it were earned by an individual.6 8
The base for the special tax would equal the product of (a) the
amount of deferred compensation and (b) the (actual or imputed)
investment yield earned thereon. 69 Halperin proposed that the
amount of deferred compensation be established by requiring the
employer to set aside funds in trust or in another segregated fund or,
alternatively, by requiring the employer to keep a notional account
without formally segregating funds (i.e., an account that exists as an

66. Halperin, supra note 22, at 539-50.
67. Id. at 548-49.
68. Id.

69. Id. at 545-48.
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entry in an accounting journal).70 Halperin did not make a specific
proposal as to how the fund's investment yield is to be determined.7"
The investment yield must be ascertained or estimated, otherwise the
base for the special tax cannot be determined. Because the base of

(i.e., the taxable income subject to) the special tax would be
computed using the tax rules applicable to individuals,72 special rules

applicable to corporations (e.g., the dividends received deduction and
the nonrecognition rule applicable to corporations when dealing in
their own stock73) would not apply. In addition, the special tax base
would be unaffected by an employer's net operating losses or
carryovers.74
The tax rate of the special tax would equal the top marginal rate
applicable to individuals. 75 The ideal rule in theory would set the tax
rate equal to the marginal tax rate of the employee whose
compensation is being deferred; however, in Halperin's view,

practical problems dictate the use of the top marginal rate for
individuals. 76 Although this rate will be too high in some cases,
Halperin dismissed the significance of this problem, noting that
"employees may always avoid the special tax by opting out of the
plan."7 7
Halperin proposed retaining the current law treatment of the
compensatory element of deferred compensation (as distinct from the
investment return thereon).78 Current law generally allows the

employer to deduct (and requires the employee to include) the entire
amount paid to the employee upon payment.7 9 This treatment is
70. Id. at 549-50 ("To implement the special tax, nonqualified deferred compensation
should be funded though a special trust or other segregated fund to facilitate identification
of the employee's share .... Identification of assets does not necessarily require a trust
and can perhaps be achieved by bookkeeping without formal segregation.").
71. Halperin did, however, analyze the issue in the context of defined benefit
arrangements and suggested possible solutions. See id. at 546-48.
72. Id. at 549.
73. I.R.C. §§ 243, 1032 (2000).
74. Halperin, supra note 22, at 544.
75. Id. at 549.
76. Id. at 544-45.
77. Id. at 545. The top marginal rate may be higher than the employee's effective
marginal tax rate (i.e., economic burden of the tax that would have applied had the
employee made the investment directly) for myriad reasons. For example, (1) the
investment income may be eligible for the capital gains rate preference, I.R.C. § 1(h), (2)
the employee may have capital losses (that would otherwise not be currently used) to
absorb these capital gains, I.R.C. § 1211, or (3) the employee's marginal tax rate may be
lower than the maximum rate.
78. Halperin, supra note 22, at 549.
79. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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economically similar to (in certain cases, identical to) accrual taxation
because the present value of the future payment is at least
approximately equal to the amount of compensation currently
earned.8 1 In light of this equivalency, Halperin concludes that
administrative considerations make deferral of the employee's

inclusion and the employer's deduction preferable.8"

Thus, returning to Example 1, the Temple would be subject to a

40% tax82 on the 10% investment yield earned on the amount held in
trust. Assuming that the investment yield is taxed year-by-year (and
not deferred under the realization rule, for example), the tax will
reduce the annual yield on the deferred compensation from 7.2% to
4.3%.83 In Year 10, therefore, the Rabbi would be paid $15,244,84

which would leave him $9,147 after tax.85 This is identical to the
result achieved under option (a), where the Rabbi is paid $10,000
currently and invests the $6,000 net-of-tax proceeds for his own
account at a 6% annual return.8 6 Thus, Halperin's special tax on

investment income is one way to achieve greater neutrality between
current and deferred compensation.8 7
B.

Accrual Taxation of Deferred Compensation

Another approach is the direct taxation of the employee on both
the compensatory element and its yield when earned, on an accrual
basis. For instance, Michael Doran, stimulated by Congress's recent
80. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (demonstrating the present value
equivalency in Example 1). The equivalency is only approximate, rather than perfect, in
cases where the employer's aftertax rate of return differs from the aftertax rate earned on
the deferred compensation. See Halperin, supra note 22, at 532 & n.95; infra Part IV.A.3.
81. Halperin, supra note 22, at 541-42.
82. In Example 1, the Rabbi is in the 40% bracket; this illustration assumes that rate
to be the highest marginal tax rate applicable to individuals.
83. The realization rule might not be implicated, for instance, if the trust assets are
invested in a bond that pays interest at least annually and all of the investment yield is
attributable to interest, not price appreciation. We address below whether the special tax
should incorporate the realization rule or, instead, should be applied on a mark-to-market
basis. See infra Part III.A.3.
84. $10,000 x (1 + 4.3%)" 0 = $15,244.38.
This assumes that the contractual
arrangement between Rabbi and Temple provides that the amount of the special tax paid
by the Temple reduces dollar-for-dollar the amount owed to Rabbi upon the payment
event. In other words, it assumes that the Temple's tax liability will be funded out of the
trust.
85. $15,244 x (1 - 0.4) = $9,147.
86. $10,000 x (1 - 0.4) x (1 + 4.3%)'o = $9,147.
87. On the facts of Example 1, Halperin's proposal would result in perfect neutrality,
but this would not always be true. For example, if the employee's effective tax on
investment income were lower than the top marginal rate, Halperin's proposal would
create a bias in favor of current compensation.
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enactment of §409A, which imposes accrual taxation on certain
"bad" nonqualified deferred compensation plans,8 8 has proposed
extending accrual taxation to all nonqualified deferred compensation
plans.89

The accrual taxation approach treats the parties as though the
employer paid the employee currently and the employee lent the
funds back to her employer for the period of deferral.9" If this were to
occur, then under existing law the employee would be taxed currently
on the compensation, and the employer would get a corresponding

deduction. Neither the disbursement of the loan proceeds by the
lender-employee to the borrower-employer nor the repayment would
give rise to tax consequences, but interest accruing on the loan would
be accounted for by both the lender-employee and the borroweremployer as it accrues economically. 91
This approach differs from Professor Halperin's special tax in
three fundamental ways. First, the accrual approach encompassed in
§ 409A imposes the nominal burden of the tax on investment income
on the employee rather than on the employer.' Second, because the

accrual approach taxes the investment yield through to the employee,
it uses the employee's marginal tax rate instead of using the highest
individual marginal tax rate as a proxy. Third, instead of taxing the

employee on (and permitting the employer a deduction for) the
compensatory element of deferred compensation-as distinct from
the investment yield thereon-when paid, the § 409A approach would

88. In general, I.R.C. § 409A imposes accrual taxation when the deferred
compensation arrangement provides the employee with certain rights-for example, the
ability to accelerate payment-that Congress determined ought to be proscribed if the
employee is to receive the benefit of tax deferral.

See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON

TAXATION, 108TH CONG., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF ENRON CORPORATION AND
RELATED ENTITIES REGARDING FEDERAL TAX AND COMPENSATION ISSUES, AND

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 632-37 (Comm.

Print 2003) (recommending

reforms

ultimately codified at § 409A).
89. DORAN, supra note 25, at 1-2.

90. See Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1(a) (2006) (requiring that, under the accrual method,
income is generally realized when earned, and deductions are generally allowed when the
liability for payment is incurred).
91. See I.R.C. § 1272(a) (2000) (requiring holder of debt instrument with original issue
discount to include in gross income the interest on such debt as it economically accrues);
id. § 163(e) (allowing corresponding deduction to issuer of debt instrument with original
issue discount).
92. As discussed above, the placement of the nominal burden is usually not
significant. Which party bears the economic burden of the tax, which is significant, will
depend on the parties' bargain. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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result in the immediate deduction and inclusion of the compensation
when earned.9 3
On the facts of Example 1, the Rabbi would be taxed on $10,000
in Year 0, when the compensation is earned. Then the Rabbi would
be taxed, year-by-year, on the investment yield to the deferred
compensation "loan." During the first year, for example, the Rabbi
would be taxed on $718, the excess of the amount held in the trust at
the end of the year-$10,718-over the amount held at the beginning
of Year 1-$10,000. During the second year, the Rabbi would be
taxed on $769, the excess of the amount held at the end of the year$11,487-over the amount held at the beginning of the year-$10,718.
And so on. The year-by-year tax on the investment yield is
effectively the same as Halperin's special tax.
The results under the accrual tax approach are economically
equivalent to the results under option (a), where the Rabbi is paid
$10,000 currently and invests the $6,000 net proceeds for his own
account at a 4.3% annual return.94 Thus, accrual taxation is another
way to achieve neutrality between current and deferred
compensation.
C. Deconstructingthe Proposals
Although the two systems outlined above appear quite different,
they are economically equivalent.95 One way to see this equivalency
is to observe that both systems leave the employee who receives
deferred compensation in the same aftertax position in Year 10 as the
93. See I.R.C. § 409A(a)(1)(A) (requiring accrual accounting for deferred
compensation income when the deferred compensation plan fails to meet certain statutory
requirements); id. § 404(a)(5) (keying the timing of the employer's deduction to the timing
of the employee's inclusion). Our discussion of I.R.C. § 409A disregards the interest and
See id.
penalties applicable to "bad" nonqualified deferred compensation.
§ 409A(a)(1)(B).
94. The timing of the cash flows is different for options (a) and (b) under an accrual
taxation regime, but the present values of the flows are identical. Under option (b), the
Rabbi must pay the tax liability attributable to the deferred compensation in Years 0
through 10 with separate funds because the tax liability does not reduce the amount
invested in the trust for the employee's benefit. Cf supra note 84. In Year 10, the Rabbi
would receive a distribution of $20,000, the future value of $10,000 earning 7.2% per year.
In the interim, however, the Rabbi would have paid taxes annually on accrued income
($4,000 of tax in Year 0, $420 in Year 1, $431 in Year 2, $443 in Year 3, etc.). The future
value of these payments in Year 18, computed using the 4.3% aftertax yield available to
the Rabbi, is $10,853. The net benefit to the Rabbi from the arrangement is $9,147
($20,000 - $10,853) in Year 10, which equals the net benefit in Year 10 under option (a).
95. They are economically equivalent putting aside certain ancillary tax provisions
that might come into play, such as the dividends received deduction under I.R.C. § 243.
These complicating factors are addressed below in Part III.
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employee would have occupied had she taken current compensation
and invested for her own account; that is, both systems are neutral.
The differences between them relate to their administration.
There are three obvious differences between the proposals. The
first two relate to the taxation of the investment component.
Halperin's special tax on investment income imposes the tax on the
employer and sets the tax rate at the top marginal tax rate for
individuals;96 the accrual taxation model, on the other hand, imposes
the tax directly on the employee and uses the appropriate marginal
rate for that employee.' 7 The third difference relates to the taxation
of the compensatory element. Halperin's proposal would leave in
place current law, which allows the employee to defer inclusion of
(and requires the employer to defer deduction of) the compensatory
portion of the payment until payment; 98 in contrast, the accrual
taxation model would tax (and permit a deduction for) the
compensatory element when earned. 99

These two proposals do not exhaust the universe of options.
Each of the three key elements of a deferred compensation tax
regime-the taxation of investment income, the inclusion of the
compensatory element by the employee, and the deduction of the
compensatory element by the employer-could be reckoned for tax
purposes (1) at the beginning-i.e., when the compensation is earned;
(2) at the end-i.e., when the period of deferral ends; or
(3) periodically-i.e., throughout the period of deferral. So long as
the base for taxation is properly adjusted in each instance to account
for the time value of money, each element could be accounted for at
any of the three stages, without undermining neutrality.
Furthermore, consistency is not required. For example, a neutral
system might tax the employee on the compensatory element at the
end of the deferral period, while at the same time allowing the
employer to take its compensation deduction at the outset.
Finally, responsibility for remitting tax (and eligibility for
deductions) can be assigned to either party to the compensation
arrangement without changing the economics, provided that the
parties face equivalent tax rates. Consider, for instance, that on the

facts of Example 1, Halperin's special tax would impose the burden
96.
97.
98.
99.
income
liability

Halperin, supra note 22, at 549.
See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
Halperin, supra note 22, at 549.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1(a) (2006) (requiring that, under the accrual method,
is generally realized when earned and deductions are generally allowed when the
for payment is incurred).
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on the employer (using the top marginal tax rate for individuals as a
proxy for the Rabbi's marginal tax rate), which would cause a
reduction in the aftertax yield from 7.2% to 4.3%. The accrual tax
model, on the other hand, would impose the burden directly on the
Rabbi, who would continue to earn 7.2% on the deferred
compensation throughout the period of deferral. But the Rabbi
would have to remit a tax representing 40% of the investment yield,
which would effectively drive down his aftertax yield from 7.2% to
4.3%.10° The parties would also be indifferent as to the identity of the
payor of the tax on, and the recipient of the deduction for, the
compensatory element of the arrangement, provided that the
employer's and employee's tax rates are the same, since they could
shift the incidence of the tax by adjusting the nominal pretax
compensation. °1 If rates are different then there is an incentive to
allocate income (deductions) to the party with the lower (higher)
marginal tax rate.
In the two Parts that follow, we address how neutral taxation of
deferred compensation can be achieved with the lowest
administrative burden and potential for abuse. Part III addresses
how the special tax on investment income should be formulated. Part
IV addresses when the employee's compensatory income should be
taxed and the employer's compensatory deduction allowed.
III. FORMULATING THE SPECIAL TAX
Following Professor Halperin, we will refer to the tax burden
imposed on the investment return earned on deferred compensation
during the period of deferral as a "special tax." As illustrated in
Example 1, without a special tax, there will often be a tax bias in favor
of deferred compensation. To say that neutrality depends on a
special tax, however, does not end the matter. There are several
features of the special tax that must be specified, many of which
present tradeoffs between neutrality and ease of administration.

100. See supra note 94.
101. In other words, assuming the parties faced equivalent tax rates, if responsibility
for remitting the tax were placed on the employer, the Temple would agree to provide the
Rabbi with a 4.3% yield on his deferred compensation. But if responsibility for remitting
the tax were placed on the Rabbi, the Temple would agree to provide the Rabbi with a
7.2% yield. The two transactions would have the same economic (i.e., aftertax) results for
each party. The assumption as to equivalent tax rates is critical and, of course, quite
artificial. In fact, assuming equivalent tax rates for the parties, current law works perfectly
well as the correct tax on the investment yield, while payable by the employer, is charged.
Polsky & Hellwig, supra note 39, at 1143-44.
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There are at least two ways of integrating the special tax with the
preexisting tax rules-either the special tax could be imposed in
addition to the preexisting rules, or instead of those rules. To
illustrate the instead of approach, consider an employer that parks

assets (of the employee's choosing) in a trust..2 (as in Example 1),
rather than paying the employee cash currently, which would permit
the employee to make the investment directly. A neutral solution
would be to impose the special tax on the income earned by the funds

in the trust, to exclude that income from the employer's tax base, and
to deny the employer an interest deduction for funds constructively
borrowed from the employee. No employer interest deduction is
warranted since in substance the employer is not borrowing from the
employee so much as investing on the employee's behalf.
A serious drawback of this approach is that a rule needs to be
devised to deal with the situation where the employer does not park
assets in a trust or other segregated fund, but instead uses the funds

for capital investment in its business, to fund working capital, to
reduce borrowing, or the like. Such a rule might deem that the
employer had set up a hypothetical trust and then borrowed funds

from that trust for business purposes.0 3

Under this approach, it

would be necessary to account for the investment performance of
funds in the hypothetical trust, since the yield earned on these funds

is the special tax base, and to permit the employer an interest
deduction for the money it has constructively borrowed from the
employee.' t

4

It would also be necessary to distinguish cases where the

employer sets up a trust (or other segregated fund) from cases where
it does not, since the tax ramifications would differ. Suppose, for
example, that an employer is obligated to pay deferred compensation
102. Whenever we use the term "trust" or "segregated fund" we refer to the typical
deferred compensation arrangements that qualify as "rabbi trusts," which are, under
current law, effectively ignored for tax purposes. See supra note 16.
103. Professor Halperin's proposal uses this approach. Halperin, supra note 22, at 54647 (suggesting that in the absence of a segregated fund the employer should be permitted
an interest deduction).
104. Essentially, the hypothetical trust which invests for the employee's benefit and
lends money to the employer is a disaggregated version of the actual deferred
compensation transaction. In form, the employer makes a promise to pay the employee
some amount in the future. One way to view the substance of this transaction is to recast
it as though (1) the employer pays the employee currently, (2) the employee loans the
current payment to the employer, (3) the employer invests for the employee's benefit the
sum borrowed from the employee, and (4) the employer pledges the investment it has
made for the employee's benefit as collateral for a second loan that it uses to fund its
business. The yield on the investment in step (3) of the recast transaction is the special tax
base. The interest accruing on the loan in step (4) of the recast transaction should
generate an interest deduction for the employer.
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and the investment performance on the deferred compensation is tied
to the performance of General Motors stock. Suppose further that
the employer has a portfolio investment in General Motors stock (but
such stock is not formally earmarked as an investment made on
Does the employer get an interest
behalf of the employee).
deduction in this circumstance?" 5
The complications are somewhat less severe if the special tax is
imposed in addition to the normal tax rules. Under this alternative
(1) the investment yield (either actual or imputed) on the deferred
compensation is subject to the special tax, (2) the employer is taxed as
it normally would be on any income it earns when it invests the funds
that it did not pay the employee currently, irrespective of whether it
segregates funds for the employee's benefit or instead uses the funds
in its business, and (3) the employer gets an interest deduction for the
funds it has constructively borrowed from its employee. 10 6 The
advantage of the in addition to approach is that it obviates the need to
distinguish between cases where the employer sets aside funds and
where it does not.
In general terms, if the employer sets aside funds in a trust or
segregated fund, then the income actually earned by the funds in the
trust will be offset by the interest deduction on the constructive
employee-to-employer loan under an in addition to approach.
Because the income and deduction offset, this is the same economic
result reached under the instead of approach. On the other hand, if
the employer does not set aside funds but instead uses the funds in its
business, the employer will enjoy a benefit from its interest deduction,
which is appropriate since the employer would have gotten an interest
deduction had it borrowed a like sum from a lender that was not its
employee. For the balance of this Part we assume that the in addition
to model is selected. We think it is the better selection both because
of the administrative advantages described above and because we
105. Professor Halperin suggests that employers be required to set up a "trust or other
segregated fund," which would obviously eliminate the need to make this determination.
Halperin, supra note 22, at 549. As he notes, however, "a trust could not be mandated
without a change in current law," which precludes deferral in the case of funded trusts,
I.R.C. § 402(a) (2000), and this requirement could impair some firms' access to credit.
Halperin, supra note 22, at 550. He also concedes that offering employees greater security
might be unwise given the effect it would have on incentives to offer qualified deferred

compensation. Id. at 550 n.164.
106. The constructive loan can be seen by disaggregating the deferred compensation
payment into a current salary payment by the employer to the employee followed by a
loan from the employee to the employer. The amount of the salary payment and the loan
net to zero, so we do not observe this transfer, but in substance this is what is transpiring.
See supra note 104; infra Part III.A.4.
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think it is politically unlikely that a proposal would succeed that
forced employers to fund a trust or trust-like arrangement and
thereby denied firms ready access to the credit extended by
employees who agree to be paid deferred rather than current
compensation.
We address the issues raised in formulating the special tax below,
first addressing the issues raised by defined contribution plans, °7 and
then turning to defined benefit plans."°8
A.

Defined ContributionPlans
1. Special Tax Base

For defined contribution plans, the special tax base is simply the
product of (a) defined contribution and (b) the rate of return
specified in the agreement between employer and employee. 10 9 The
special tax base should be determined without consideration of any
tax preferences to which the employee would not ordinarily be
entitled, such as the dividends received deduction under § 243.11°
Assuming (as will likely be the case) that the special tax is
imposed periodically, the investment growth already subject to the
special tax in prior periods must be subtracted from the special tax
base to avoid double counting. This will occur automatically in
certain circumstances. For example, suppose that the employer
establishes a segregated account to hold the deferred compensation
and that the special tax is imposed on the employer. If the employer
pays the special tax by withdrawing funds from this account, then the
special tax base is the difference between the account balance at the
end of the tax period and the account balance at the beginning of the
tax period.
107. Defined contribution plans specify the amount the employer will invest on the
employee's behalf. Employees participating in defined contribution plans bear the
investment performance risk for the deferred compensation; the employer makes no
guarantee regarding how much will be paid when the period of deferral ends. (For this
reason, the employee typically selects the investments, or at least the investment strategy,
to be used in a defined contribution plan).
108. Defined benefit plans specify the amount the employer is required to pay the
employee in the future. The amount is sometimes a fixed sum, but more typically is
specified formulaically, for example as a percentage of the employee's average wages
during the final few years of employment.
109. But see infra Part IV.A.4 (discussing one instance where the rate specified in the
parties' agreement should not be respected).
110. Section 243 would ordinarily shield from tax between 70% and 100% of the
dividends received by a corporation, but it does not apply to dividends received by an
individual. I.R.C. § 243(a), (c).
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However, determining the special tax base is more complicated if
the employee pays the special tax or if the employer pays the special
tax without subtracting the special tax payments from its future
obligation to the employee. Where the employee pays the special tax,
the employee's special tax payment is, in effect, an employee-toemployer loan. The employee is forced to pay taxes attributable to
the investment yield; meanwhile, the employer enjoys use of the
investment in its business without an obligation to pay current
interest. As a result, part of the deferred compensation's investment
growth is accrued interest on this loan and is not technically part of
the special tax base, but treating it as such does not create any
additional distortion 1 and keeps the accounting simple.
Where the employer pays the special tax with separate funds
(i.e., funds not committed to the deferred compensation account),
similar complexities arise. There are two ways to look at this case.
Under one view, the arrangement's nominal defined contribution is
less than the defined contribution that exists as an economic matter,
because the employer is conferring a benefit on the employee equal
to the present value of the future special tax payments.'12
Alternatively, the employer could be viewed as paying additional
deferred compensation equal in timing and amount to its periodic
special tax payments.
2. Identity of the Payor; Special Tax Rate
It is theoretically unimportant whether the employer or the
employee remits the special tax. The employer's concern will be its
total aftertax cost of remunerating a given employee. The employee's
concern will be her total aftertax income. The special tax drives a
wedge between the two: It raises the cost to the employer of
providing the employee with the same aftertax income. The tax
wedge is the same size regardless of whether the duty to remit the tax
is imposed on the employer or the employee. The parties can shift
the economic incidence of the special tax from employer to employee
(or vice versa) simply by adjusting the nominal return deemed to be
earned on the defined contribution.
Three factors, however, make the identity of the payor an issue
of practical significance: (1) if the burden for remitting the special tax
111. As discussed below in Part III.A.3, we propose that the special tax be imposed on
a mark-to-market basis, which would impugn neutrality to some extent in certain
situations. See infra notes 129-40 and accompanying text.
112. The problem of artificially low (or high) defined contributions is discussed in more
detail below in Part IV.A.4.
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is placed on the employee, it is easier to take into account the
employee's particular circumstances when setting the special tax rate
and determining if preferences apply (such as a lower rate of tax on
capital gains); (2) if the burden is placed on the employee, the
obligation to remit the special tax would precede the receipt of funds
with which to pay the tax, raising liquidity concerns; and (3) if the
burden is placed on the employee, it limits policymakers' flexibility in
determining when the employee will be required to include in
income, and the employer will be allowed to deduct, the
compensatory element of deferred compensation." 3 We address the
first and second factors in turn below, and the third factor in the next
Section." 4
Tax rate.-If the obligation to remit the special tax is imposed on
the employee, it is easy to set the rate equal to the employee's
marginal tax rate given that the employee must compile all of the
information necessary to determine her marginal tax rate as part of
her preexisting tax return filing obligation.'
This is the ideal rate in
theory, because the goal of the special tax is to match the results
that
116
would follow if the employee had invested for her own account.
If compensation is paid currently, the employee could invest the
aftertax income in capital assets giving rise to income eligible for the
preferential capital gains tax rate." 7
Corporate dividends are
currently taxed at the same preferential rate.' 18 So long as the special
tax is imposed on the employee, it would be feasible to calculate the
special tax rate to take into account whatever preferences are
available to the employee. If the employee's W-2 reflects both the
amount and character of the income generated by the actual or
constructive investment funded by the defined contribution, the

113. Specifically, placing the tax burden on the employee effectively precludes deferral
of inclusion and deduction of the compensatory element of the deferred compensation
plan by the employee and the employer, respectively, for reasons discussed below. See
infra Part IV.A.2.
114. Id. (explaining that if the employee remits the special tax, deferring the
employee's inclusion and employer's deduction of the compensatory element until
payment becomes unwieldy).
115. In other words, if the obligation to remit were imposed on the employee, the
employee could simply include the investment income earned on the deferred
compensation in her gross income as if the investment income were earned directly by her.
116. Cf Christopher H. Hanna, The Virtual Reality of Eliminating Tax Deferral, 12
AM. J. TAX POL'Y 449, 508 (1995) (criticizing the interest charge method in § 453A(c) for
using the highest marginal tax rate in computing the interest charge instead of using the
taxpayer's actual marginal rate).
117. See I.R.C. § 1(h)(1) (2000).
118. Seeid. § 1(h)(11).
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employee could incorporate this information into her individual tax
return.11 9 This would permit application not only of the capital gains
and dividend income tax preferences, but also enable the employee to
make myriad other adjustments on her individual return that depend
on the character of items of income, gain, deduction, or loss.12
If, on the other hand, the obligation to remit the special tax is
placed on the employer, it becomes far more difficult to set the
special tax rate equal to the rate the employee would have borne had
she made the investment for her own account. The employer
generally will not know the employee's marginal rate. Forcing
1 21
employees to divulge the necessary details raises privacy concerns.
Furthermore, the incremental compliance burden might be
substantial given that the employer would, in effect, be required to
prepare a duplicate of the employee's tax return to determine its
special tax liability. We agree with Professor Halperin that if the
employer remits the special tax, the only practical alternative is to use
a proxy rate, such as the top marginal rate for individuals.1 22 Yet, for
the reasons outlined above relating to the characterization of income,
in a substantial number of cases this rate would be too high, creating a
tax bias against deferred compensation.
Liquidity.-If the obligation to remit the special tax is imposed
on the employee, the employee's tax burden will not be accompanied
by the receipt of cash. On the other hand, if the obligation to remit
the special tax is imposed on the employer, the liquidity issue is
resolved, at least for the most part.
One possible solution would be to place the ultimate burden for
the special tax on the employee but to place the duty to withhold tax
and remit payment on the employer. 23 In this system, the income
119. As explained above, the employer can be viewed as investing the deferred
compensation for the employee's benefit regardless of whether such an investment occurs
in fact. See supra note 104.
120. For instance, the employee could (1) set off capital losses outside the deferred
compensation plan with gains inside the plan, see I.R.C. § 1222, (2) compute net
investment income for purposes of computing the limitation on investment interest by
reference to investment income earned by the deferred compensation plan, see id.
§ 163(d), and (3) compute any alternative minimum tax liability, see id. § 55.
121. For example, employees might be loath to tell their employer of the details of
their securities market transactions, or how much money their spouse earns. Both pieces
of information would be required in routine cases for the employer to determine the
employee's marginal tax rate on the income in question.
122. Halperin, supra note 22, at 544.
123. Halperin discusses the possibility of enforcing accrual taxation of all compensation
through withholding. He concludes that accrual taxation of all compensation (even with
withholding) would encounter "serious obstacles" (including liquidity), which is a problem
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subject to the special tax and the amount withheld by the employer
would appear on the employee's W-2. If the employer overwithholds

because of some peculiarity of the employee's tax position
unbeknownst to the employer, the employee will be entitled to a

refund, as typically occurs under current administrative practice. On
the other hand, if the employer underwithholds the employee will
have to make up the difference, but 1the
liquidity problem will have
extent. 24

been mitigated to a significant
We are persuaded that liquidity is not a significant concern for
the class of taxpayers who are remunerated through deferred

compensation arrangements, 125 and we take seriously the notion that
the policy goal in setting the rule for the taxation of nonqualified
126
deferred compensation should be to preserve neutrality.

Calibrating the special tax rate correctly is more important than
alleviating the liquidity issue that is more apparent than real,
particularly since the liquidity problem can be ameliorated through

withholding. Consequently, there is a compelling argument that the
employee should be required to remit the special tax.'2 7

he attributes more to perception than reality. As Halperin notes and as we discuss below,
accrual taxation coupled with withholding would not ordinarily be burdensome. See id., at
541-42 & n.136; infra Part IV.C.
124. In a rare case, an employee's current compensation in a given year could be
outstripped by the tax liability attributable to investment returns on balances in their
deferred compensation account, so withholding zeroes out current compensation.
Affected taxpayers are likely to be extremely wealthy and thus able to pay the additional
tax without difficulty.
125. Liquidity is discussed in greater detail below. See infra Part IV.C.
126. Halperin acknowledges that his proposed solution of using the top rate for
individuals would result in erring to the high side "in some cases," but he argues that "this
rate preserves the maximum incentive for deferral through qualified plans." Halperin,
supra note 22, at 544-45. Setting the rate at the top marginal rate for individuals would
likely result in overtaxation in a significant number of cases (perhaps most cases) given
that deferred compensation is often invested in assets that would be eligible for the capital
gains and qualified dividend income tax rate preferences if the employee made the
investment directly. As for "preserv[ing] the maximum incentive for deferral through
qualified plans," id., the ability to avoid tax on the inside build-up on qualified plan
accounts is a strong incentive for companies to maintain such plans-together with
whatever protections their nondiscrimination rules provide-but the existence of qualified
deferred compensation does not, in our view, justify creating tax distortion at the margin
between current and nonqualified deferred compensation.
127. At this juncture we are considering in isolation the policy choice regarding the
identity of the payor. This choice has important implications for the choice of the timing
of the employee's inclusion, and the employer's deduction of the compensatory element of
the deferred compensation, as discussed below, and deferring the inclusion and deduction
might be impossible as a practical matter if the special tax burden is not placed on the
employer. See infra Part IV.A.2 & CONCLUSIONS (3 & 4).
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3. Realization Versus Mark-to-Market Accounting
The special tax on the investment yield could in principle be
imposed on either a realization or mark-to-market basis," regardless
of which party remits the tax. Imposing the special tax on a
realization basis appears to be the most neutral rule when viewed
from the employee's perspective. The standard for neutrality is what
would have occurred had the employee been paid cash and invested
for her own account outside of the deferred compensation context. In
this circumstance the employee would get the benefit of the
realization rule. At first blush it seems that she should get the same
benefit when she invests through a deferred compensation plan.
From a joint contracting perspective, however, it is more neutral
to impose the special tax on a mark-to-market basis. 2 9 If the
employer makes a portfolio investment to backstop its obligation
under the deferred compensation plan, the employer will get the
benefit of the realization rule. 3 ° At the same time, the employer
should be allowed to deduct periodically the interest accruing on the
constructive loan outstanding from the employee.'
Taken together,
these two rules will provide the employer with a timing benefit
resulting from a combination of a current deduction for interest and
deferred income from the portfolio investment. The consequence is
to shift the benefit of the realization rule from the employee to the
employer. There is no reason to expect that the economic benefit of
the realization rule will coincide with the nominal benefit. Just as the
parties can be expected to shift the economic incidence of the special
tax between themselves, they can be expected to shift the economic
benefit of the realization rule. Thus, allocating the nominal benefit of
the realization rule to the "wrong" party (employer rather than
employee) is of no theoretical significance.
There are two important qualifications to the foregoing analysis.
First, the benefit of exploiting the realization rule will be worth more
to the employer than the employee if the tax rate on the employer's
128. Under mark-to-market accounting, gains and losses are taken into account for tax
purposes annually as they accrue, regardless of whether there has been a realization event.
129. In this regard, our assumption that an in addition to approach will be used is
critical. If an instead of approach is used, then in the segregated fund context it would
better promote neutrality to impose the special tax on a realization basis, even when
viewed from a joint contracting perspective.
130. Thus, for example, if the employer purchases Microsoft stock to backstop its
obligations under a deferred compensation arrangement based on the value of such stock,
the employer will realize income only upon the disposition of the stock.
131. We discuss the rationale behind the employers interest deduction below. See infra
Part III.A.4.
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investment income is higher than the employee's. 13 2 In certain
instances, the employer may face a higher tax rate on investment
income than its employee, even if ordinary income rates for
employers and employees are the same (as is true currently), because
the employee but not the employer is eligible for the capital gains rate
133
preference and a reduced rate of tax on qualified dividend income.
In this case, shifting the benefit of realization from the employee to
the employer is not a zero sum proposition; it would result in tax
savings to the parties in the aggregate."
Second, the employer might use the funds it would have paid the
employee had the parties bargained for current rather than deferred
compensation-in other words, the borrowing implicit in the deferred
compensation arrangement-to finance its normal business
operations, rather than investing in whatever portfolio securities are
necessary to backstop its deferred compensation obligation.135 If so,
whether the employer will enjoy the benefits of the realization rule
depends on which asset the borrowed funds are deemed to finance. If
it is an asset that is held by the employer for more than one year,
deferral would generally result. 136 Otherwise, no deferral would
result. 137
Given the fungibility of money, it is impossible to

132. The opposite is true if the employee has a higher tax rate on investment income
than the employer. Whichever party has a higher rate derives a greater advantage from
the deferral benefit that follows from the realization rule.
133. On the other hand, the employer-assuming it is a corporation-will be eligible
for the dividends received deduction, unlike the employee. See I.R.C. § 243 (2000). We
address the dividends received deduction below, and suggest that the employer should be
denied the benefit of the deduction when it makes portfolio investments to backstop its
deferred compensation obligation. See infra notes 149-55 and accompanying text.
134. This tax minimization technique is in no way unique to the deferred compensation
context. Whenever a high-bracket taxpayer borrows from a low-bracket taxpayer and
uses the funds to finance a project, the gains from which are tax deferred, the parties will
in the aggregate derive a tax benefit because interest on the loan will be deductible by the
high-bracket borrower as it accrues economically while the tax on the project gains will be
deferred.
135. An employer backstops its deferred compensation obligation by purchasing the
benchmark security for the deferred compensation arrangement, thereby hedging the risk
of appreciation in that security.
Thus, for example, if the employer's deferred
compensation obligation is tied to the future value of 100 shares of Microsoft stock, the
employer could backstop that obligation by purchasing that amount of Microsoft stock.
136. For example, if the borrowed funds are deemed to finance a stock purchase, then
the employer obtains a deferral benefit resulting from the realization rule.
137. For example, if the borrowed funds are deemed to finance the purchase of
inventory that turns over within the taxable year, the employer would obtain no deferral
benefit because the employer would realize gain within the current year.
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definitively establish what asset is financed with these funds.'38 (Note,
however, that this is true even when the employer invests in portfolio
assets to backstop its deferred compensation obligation-although
when there is a portfolio investment to backstop the deferred
compensation plan, the connection between the employer's implicit
borrowing and its investment seems less attenuated than when the
funds are used by the employer for general purposes.)
Finally, consider the complications that would result from
imposing the special tax on a realization basis. Suppose the employer
makes a portfolio investment to backstop its deferred compensation
obligation (so that the constructive employee-to-employer loan is
easily traceable to an asset that would entitle the employer to the
benefit of the realization rule).
Both the special tax and the
employer's income tax would be imposed on a realization basis, while
the employer would be allowed to deduct periodically the interest
expense accruing on the loan implicit in the deferred compensation
arrangement.139 Hence, rather than simply shifting the realization
rule timing benefit from the employee to the employer-as occurs
when the special tax is imposed on a mark-to-market basis-the
timing benefit would have been duplicated.
It could be argued that duplicating the benefit of the realization
rule is appropriate. Suppose, for instance, the employer paid the
employee cash currently and borrowed a like sum of money from a
third party. If both the employee and the employer invested their
respective funds (i.e., the employee's pay and the employer's loan
proceeds) in growth stock, both would be eligible for the benefit of
the realization rule. Viewed from this perspective, duplicating the
benefits of the realization rule produces the correct result. This
analogy is inapt, however. In the deferred compensation context the
employer should be seen as borrowing funds from the employee
rather than from a third party; consequently, the employer and the
employee could not make simultaneous growth stock investments
since only the employer would have cash to invest, the employee
having implicitly loaned the cash to the employer. Thus, either the
employee or the employer should get the benefit of the realization
rule, but not both.1 40 To prevent both from enjoying the benefit, an
138. Because money is fungible, it is impossible to determine
purchased by the employer with the extra cash the employer has
borrowing implicit in the deferred compensation arrangement.
139. See infra Part III.A.4.
140. Likewise, either the employer or the employee should get
available tax preference, such as having investment income classified

exactly what was
as a result of the
the benefit of any
as capital gains. If
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offsetting adjustment would be necessary. Either the employer's
investment income, to the extent it is deemed to have been purchased
to backstop its deferred compensation obligation, would have to be

taxed on a mark-to-market basis; alternatively, the employer's
interest deduction on the loan implicit in the deferred compensation
arrangement would have to be deferred until the employer's
investment income is included in income.'4 1
In the end, imposing the special tax on a mark-to-market basis is

superior to imposing the special tax on a realization basis given the
administrative difficulties of implementing a neutral realization-based
special tax, even though a mark-to-market special tax will impugn
neutrality when employer and employee tax rates differ. This

conclusion in this Section is in tension with our conclusion, explained
above, that neutrality is better served by imposing the special tax on
the employee. 142 The advantage of imposing the special tax on the

employee is that it facilitates the use of the employee's actual
marginal tax rate, taking into account the capital gain preference.
The tension is caused by the requirement that to enjoy the capital
gains preference, the asset in question must be held for over one year,
and mark-to-market accounting posits a constructive sale of the assets
on the last day of the taxable year. 143 A rule could be devised to
disregard the constructive year-end sale when determining the
employee's holding period, or to determine the holding period by
reference to the length of the deferral period called for by the
underlying deferred compensation arrangement. Alternatively, a rule
akin to § 1256(a)(3) could be applied to arbitrarily classify a given

percentage of the year-end mark-to-market gain or loss as long term,

our suggestion regarding which party should pay the special tax, see supra Part III.A.2,
were adopted, however, the capital gains classification and other tax preferences could be
duplicated for the same reason. This is unfortunate, but not of great significance at least
for corporate employers who enjoy no capital gains tax preference (although the limit on
deducting capital losses under § 1211 makes corporations sensitive to this issue
nonetheless).
141. Either strategy would be considerably more difficult if the funds the employer has
borrowed from the employee are not easily traceable to a portfolio investment made to
backstop the employer's obligation. In such cases it would be necessary to employ an
arbitrary rule to determine which of the employei's investments were financed with the
borrowed funds, and quite possibly, to appraise hard-to-value investments annually to
implement mark-to-market taxation.
142. See supraPart III.A.2.
143. More precisely, individual taxpayers enjoy a capital gains tax preference on their
"net capital gain" for a given year, I.R.C. § 1(h) (2000), defined as "the excess of the net
long term capital gain for the taxable year over the net short term capital loss for such
year." Id. § 1222(11).
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and the balance as short term. 14 4 Either way, the proliferation of
special rules in pursuit of neutrality at some point raises the question
whether the incremental neutrality improvement can justify the
added complexity.
4. Employer's Interest Deduction
The employer should be given an interest deduction for money it
has effectively borrowed from the employee. Although the employer
is not formally issuing a security to the employee or engaging in a
transaction denominated as a loan, it is functionally issuing debt to its
employee. 45
If the security issuance and the compensation
transaction are disaggregated-for instance, if an employer issues a
note to the employee in lieu of the cash it would otherwise pay its
employee currently-it becomes apparent that the employer should
get a deduction for interest accruing on the implicit loan.
To make the same point another way, suppose an employer pays
its employee currently. The funds paid are not available to the
employer for use in its business. To put itself in the same position it
would have occupied had it paid deferred rather than current
compensation, the employer must raise funds through (taxdeductible) borrowing (from a third party lender or perhaps from the
employee).
If the tax law does not take cognizance of the
constructive employee-to-employer loan and permit an interest
deduction, current compensation followed by an explicit loan from
the employee to the employer would be treated differently, a result
incompatible with the goal of neutralizing the taxation of current and
deferred compensation.
The interest rate used to calculate the employer's deduction
should be the same rate used to compute the investment yield on the
deferred compensation-in other words, computing the employer's
deduction should be the same exercise as computing the special tax
base.'46 This is the correct rate because an employer that chooses not
to fund its deferred compensation plan, and instead uses the funds in
its business, is in the same position as if it had borrowed an amount
equal to the defined contribution where the interest rate on the
144. Section 1256(a)(3) designates 60% of any gain or loss as long term and the 40%
balance as short term. Id. § 1256(a)(3).
145. We deal with the special case of employer stock-based deferred compensationwhere the measuring rod for the deferred future payment is the employer's stock pricebelow. See infra Part III.A.5. Here, we deal only with deferred compensation where

investment performance is measured by some other standard.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 109-10.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

borrowing is set equal to the investment yield earned under the
plan.1 47 An employer that funds its deferred compensation plan by
purchasing assets to backstop its future obligation will often have
investment income equal in amount (though perhaps different in
timing148) to the interest deduction, so the offsetting income and
deduction will net to zero. (The employer might, however, make an
investment generating income eligible for a tax preference, as
discussed below, in which case the tax liability and deduction benefit
will not net to zero.)
A complicating factor is that the employee-to-employer loan
might finance an investment eligible for a special tax preference,
giving rise to a potential tax arbitrage benefit. For example, suppose
an employer (other than X Corporation) promises to pay its
employee the pretax total return (including price appreciation
(depreciation) plus dividend yield) on 100 shares of X stock five years
hence and, further, that the employer purchases 100 shares of X stock
to backstop its future obligation. Say X trades at $35 per share and
pays dividends of $2 per year (a dividend yield of 5.7%). Each year
during the deferral period, the employer, assuming it is a corporation,
will be entitled to a dividends received deduction of $140 (70% of
$200), reducing the effective tax rate on the $200 dividend yield from
35% to 10.5%, 149 and leaving the employer with net dividend income
of $179 ($200 - $21). Meanwhile, the $3,500 implicit loan from the
employee that the employer used to purchase the 100 shares will
accrue interest of $200 (equal to the 5.7% pretax dividend yield),
generating a deduction that would save the employer $70 in taxes
($200 x 35%). Hence, the employer would net $249 ($179 + $70)
aftertax, giving it $49 more than necessary to fund the $200 increase
in its obligation to the employee. This creates a bias in favor of
deferred compensation.15
There are two ways to correct this problem. Either (a) the tax
preference could be denied or (b) the interest deduction could be
reduced or eliminated. Denying the tax preference would be easier,
at least when the tax arbitrage exploits the dividends received
deduction.
There are already rules outside the deferred
147. Halperin, supra note 22, at 547 & n.56.
148. See supra Part III.A.3 (explaining that with a mark-to-market special tax the
deferral benefit that would have been enjoyed by the employee had she invested for her
own account will nominally be shifted to the employer).
149. After allowing for the dividends received deduction, the taxable dividend will be
$0.60 ($2 - $1.40), resulting in a dividend tax of $0.21 ($0.60 x 35%). $0.21/$2.00 = 10.5%.
150. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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compensation context that are designed to thwart the purchase of
debt-financed portfolio stock by corporations; these could easily be
extended to deferred compensation arrangements. These rules
operate by limiting eligibility for the dividends received deduction.
Specifically, § 246A reduces the dividends received deduction to
the extent that the stock on which dividends are paid is debt
financed."' If, as in the foregoing example, 100% of the stock is debt
financed, the dividends received deduction would be disallowed in
full.152 A thorny issue arises when implementing rules that limit tax
preference income generated through tax deductible borrowing,
namely, how to determine whether the borrowing financed the
investment that generated the tax preference income, as opposed to
some other project. Tracing, pro-rata allocation, and stacking rules
are used in different circumstances to link borrowings with
investments.'53 Under § 246A, a tracing rule is used-the dividends
received deduction is reduced to the extent of any "indebtedness
directly attributable to investment in portfolio stock."' 54 The same
rule should be used for tying the implicit employee-to-employer loan
in a deferred compensation arrangement to investments in portfolio
stock. Although the tracing rule is economically incoherent and easy
to manipulate, it is just as easy to manipulate when the borrowing is
made outside of the deferred compensation context.'55
5. Employer Stock-Based Plans
Deferred compensation plans in which the investment return is
tied to the employer's stock price raise issues similar to other
deferred compensation plans, but the analysis is more complicated.
As detailed below, we conclude (1) that it is preferable to impose the
special tax on a realization basis for employer stock-based deferred
compensation plans (for nonemployer stock-based plans, in contrast,
a mark-to-market special tax is preferable'56 ), and (2) whether the
151. See I.R.C. § 246A(a), (c) (2000).

152. See id.
153. See generally Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Simplifying the Interest Deduction for
Individual Taxpayers, 91 TAX NOTES 1371, 1392-97 (2001) (describing these three

allocation methods).
154. I.R.C. § 246A(d)(3)(A); OBH Inc. v. United States, 397 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1158 (D.

Neb. 2005).
155. The same rationale suggests that when the employer uses the implicit loan from its
employee to finance property eligible for a business related (as opposed to investment
related) tax preference-such as accelerated depreciation-the tax arbitrage that results
should be allowed to stand, given that the employer would have been able to exploit the
tax arbitrage if it borrowed funds from a third party instead of from its employee.
156. See supra Part III.A.3.
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employer should be allowed an interest deduction on the funds
constructively borrowed from the employee (as was appropriate for
nonemployer stock-based deferred compensation plans 57 ) depends
on the nondeferred compensation analogue one accepts as the proper
standard for neutrality. 58
We emphasize at the outset, however, that reforming the tax
treatment of equity-based nonqualified deferred compensation would
be misguided unless policymakers were simultaneously to reform the
taxation of certain forms of § 83 deferred compensation. 59 Phantom
stock-an unfunded, unsecured employer promise to pay an amount
tied to the employer's future stock price--is economically
indistinguishable from restricted stock.1 6' The tax benefit from paying
employees with restricted stock, however, flows from the application
of § 83, and would not be corrected by a reform extending only to
nonqualified deferred compensation (that is, to unfunded, unsecured
promises), but not to § 83 deferred compensation. Economic identity
and tax inconsistency also describe the relationship between stock
appreciation rights (commonly, "SARs"), a form of nonqualified
deferred compensation, and NQSOs, a form of § 83 deferred
compensation. 62 Reforming the tax treatment of phantom stock or
SARs but not restricted stock or NQSOs would elevate form over
substance, creating a trap for ill-advised taxpayers, and would
inconvenience taxpayers accustomed to using one form by making
them switch to another, with no offsetting benefit.
Realization versus mark-to-market.-We argued above that it
was more neutral to apply the special tax on a mark-to-market basis
because the employer would get the benefit of the realization rule on
the investment funded by the loan implicit in the deferred
compensation. 63 The parties would allocate the deferral benefit from
the realization rule between themselves by adjusting the nominal
pretax compensation. Implementing a special tax that incorporated a
realization rule would potentially duplicate the timing benefit of the
realization rule, rather than merely shifting it (nominally) from the

157. See supra Part III.A.4.
158. In other words, the ambiguity inherent in the definition of neutrality has practical
significance in this instance. See supra Part I.B.1.
159. See supra Part I.C.
160. See supra text accompanying note 31 (describing phantom stock).
161. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text (describing restricted stock).
162. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text (describing NQSOs).
163. See supra Part III.A.3.
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employee to the employer, and duplicating the timing benefit would
create a tax bias in favor of deferred compensation.
In the context of employer stock-based plans, this analysis breaks
down. To avoid conflating the employer's compensation decision (to
issue stock-based deferred compensation, rather than paying cash)
with capital structure and investment decisions, the employer in an
employer stock-based deferred compensation plan can be seen as
repurchasing shares with the cash it would have paid its employee had
they bargained for current cash compensation." 6 If the firm paying
employer stock-based deferred compensation does not repurchase
shares, it will have different cash flows and a different capital
structure than a firm paying cash, preventing an apples-to-apples
comparison. 165 If, on the other hand, the firm paying employer stockbased deferred compensation does repurchase shares, it will have no
more cash than it would have if it had paid current cash, so it cannot
make an incremental capital investment. Given that a meaningful
comparison requires the assumption that the firm paying deferred
compensation repurchases shares, it would be incorrect to conclude
that taxing the employee on a mark-to-market basis simply shifts the
benefit of the realization rule from employee to employer, since
neither of them would get the deferral benefit of the realization rule.
It follows that the argument for imposing the special tax on a
realization basis is stronger for employer-stock-based deferred
compensation than for other forms of deferred compensation. If
taxation is generally applied to deferred
mark-to-market
compensation arrangements as we suggest above, however, simplicity
rule for this circumstance, even if it is
militates against a special
166
desirable in principle.
Employer's interest deduction.-A second complication that
arises for employer stock-based deferred compensation relates to the
Under one view, there is no
employer's interest deduction.
employee-to-employer loan implicit in a typical employer stock-based
deferred compensation arrangement. To see this, consider the first
nondeferred compensation analogue to the phantom stock plan

164. Miller & Scholes, supra note 28, at 185 (explaining that hypothesizing
corresponding transactions in this way "avoids the confounding of tax, cash flow, and risk
effects encountered so often in the standard legal and accounting discussions of
compensation plans."); see Knoll, supra note 27, at 208-09.
165. See infra text accompanying note 167.
166. A consistent rule is also desirable to deal with situations, not uncommon in
practice, where the return to deferred compensation is dependant in part on the
employer's stock price and in part on other metrics.
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described above, 6 7 where (1) the employer pays current
compensation, (2) the employee takes the net-of-tax cash and uses it
to purchase newly issued employer stock, and (3) the employer uses
the stock sale proceeds to repurchase shares in the open market.
Because this nondeferred compensation analogue is devoid of an
explicit borrowing, arguably the deferred compensation transaction is
devoid of an implicit borrowing. If so, granting the employer an
interest deduction would create a tax bias in favor of deferred
compensation.
But this is not the only way to view the transaction. A different
nondeferred compensation analogue, also discussed above, would
have (1) the employer pay the employee $100 and (2) the employee
then loan her net-of-tax salary to the employer for three years at a
market rate of interest. To account for the employer stock-based
aspect of the deferred compensation arrangement, (3) the employer
would be seen as selling a forward contract on its own stock to the
employee. 1" Under this scenario, the employer would get a $100
deduction for the salary payment and, in addition, might get an
interest deduction for the three-year employee-to-employer loan,
depending on the application of § 163(l), which disallows interest
deductions on loans whose interest rate is determined by reference to
the issuer's stock value. 169 Allowing an interest deduction in this
circumstance would not impair neutrality to the extent that the
deduction would have been available outside of the deferred
compensation context.17 °
B.

Defined Benefit Plans

The principal difficulty in formulating the special tax for defined
benefit deferred compensation plans is determining the special tax
base. The special tax base is the difference between (a) the present
value of the employer's defined benefit obligation at the end of the
year and (b) the present value of that promise at the beginning of the
year. The special tax base thus depends principally on the defined
benefit established by the deferred compensation arrangement, and
the discount rate used in the present value computation. Values for
both variables will require estimates.

167. See supra text accompanying note 32.
16& See supra text accompanying note 33.
169. See supra text accompanying note 33; IRC § 163() (2000); Rev. Rul. 2003-97,
2003-2 C.B. 380; GARLOCK, supra note 34, at § 9.09[B].
170. See supra text accompanying notes 33-36.
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If the defined benefit established by the arrangement is a fixed
sum, then no estimate is required for the first variable; however, it is
typical for defined benefit plans to be formulaic. For instance, one
common form of defined benefit plan-so called supplemental
executive retirement plans, or SERPs-often provides for a payout
that depends on final pay, entitlements under qualified plans and
Social Security benefits, and the employee's length of service. 7' In
such cases, a prediction is necessary regarding the myriad factors that
plug into the payout formula. Even in simpler cases when the defined
benefit is fixed in advance, if the timing is contingent (e.g., a fixed
sum payable at retirement), then an estimate is required regarding
the appropriate number of periods to use when discounting the
defined benefit to present value.
The second variable, the discount rate used to reduce the defined
benefit to present value, is the interest rate the employee is charging
the employer for the loan implicit in the defined benefit arrangement.
Because there is never an explicit loan, this interest rate must be
estimated. One option is to use a market rate as a proxy for what the
employee would charge had she bargained with the employer over a
rate at arms' length, such as interest rates issued by the Pension
Benefit Guarantee Corporation ("PBGC") for valuing deferred
annuities. 7 ' These rates are based on the premiums insurance
companies charge in the marketplace for paid-up annuities and thus
reflect investment yield assumptions made by professional actuaries
advising insurance companies."' Other options are to use a historic
market return, for example a return gauged by reference to U.S.
Treasury securities, or the employer's actual borrowing rate based on
bank loans, or for companies with publicly traded debt, yields in the
bond market.7 4
171. SERPs are discussed in more detail below. See infra Part IV.B.
172. These rates are posted on the PBGC web site. See PENSION BENEFIT GUAR.
CORP., VALUING IMMEDIATE AND DEFERRAL ANNUITIES, http://www.pbgc.gov/

services/interestNALANNU.HTM (last visited Nov. 6, 2006). For a description of the
procedure used to compile these rates, see EDWARD E. BURROWS, SOC. OF ACTUARIES,
FIXING THE PENSION PLAN FUNDING RULES (June 2003), http://library.soa.org/librarypdflm-rsO4-1_23.pdf.
173. See BURROWS, supra note 172.
174. If the return earned by the employer on the cash it saved by not paying current
compensation is higher or lower than the rate of return assumed in making the present
value comparison, it raises no additional complications. If the employer invests the funds

constructively borrowed from its employee and earns a rate higher (or lower) than the
employee's interest change, the employer stands in no better (or worse) position than it
would if it had taken out an explicit loan from a third party on the same terms. Halperin,
supra note 22, at 546 & n.153.
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Taxing defined benefit plans based on estimates raises critical
issues regarding whether it is necessary to correct erroneous estimates
ex post, and if it is, how to do so. This issue has implications for the
special tax and also for the proper treatment of defined benefit
deferred compensation plans if the compensatory element of such
plans is included or deducted (or both) at the beginning of the
deferral period when the right to payment is created, but before the
amount of the payout is known.175
As an initial matter, whether it is even necessary or desirable to
correct the mistaxation that results from erroneous estimates is
debatable. One argument in favor of correcting errors is that it is
necessary to achieve fair results. Although errors would result in
winners and losers, ex ante the parties will be taxed appropriately on
an expected value basis (leaving aside for the moment the likelihood
that a taxpayer would, if given the chance, pervert estimates to save
taxes). This suggests that any inequity may be more apparent than
real. 76 Thus, if we could be confident that errors resulted only from
good faith misestimation, perhaps error correction would be
unnecessary.
Nonetheless, correcting erroneous estimates is probably
necessary to keep taxpayers honest: Without error correction, there
would be a (perhaps significant) payoff from gaming the assumptions
used to compute the special tax base.'77 Generally speaking, an error
correction mechanism should reverse the under taxation that results
from erroneous estimates.
This could be done by taxing the
difference between the special tax base per the ex ante estimate and
the special tax base implied by the actual defined benefit when it
becomes known. The error-correcting tax would have to negate the
time value of money advantage of not making periodic special tax
178
payments throughout the deferral period.

175. See infra Part IV.B.1.
176. Halperin, supra note 22, at 546 & n.153 (suggesting this argument).

But see

Michael J. Graetz, Implementing a ProgressiveConsumption Tax, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1575,

1601 (1979) (arguing that "horizontal equity must be an ex post concept. Circumstances
should be considered as similar only after results are known; lucky gamblers are not the
same as unlucky gamblers").
177. In other words, without error correction, the parties to a deferred compensation
would have the incentive to use assumptions that would always result in the lowest amount
of taxation, when viewed from a joint contracting perspective. By properly correcting
errors, this incentive is removed.
178. Conceivably, the error might run against the taxpayer. If so, the tax base should
be negative, implying the party responsible for remitting the special tax should get a
deduction and perhaps even a refund.
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Although not impossible, implementing an error correction
mechanism of this sort would be complex. The current payroll tax
treatment of SERPs is proof of this complexity given that the rules
are designed to avoid the issue altogether. Section 3121(v) imposes
payroll taxes on the present value of deferred compensation when it
vests. 7 9 Recognizing the difficulty in ascertaining present value in the
context of SERPs, however, Treasury regulations provide that
employers can delay withholding payroll taxes on deferred
compensation plans providing for an amount that is not "reasonably
ascertainable. 1 80 An amount is not reasonably ascertainable until the
"amount, form, and commencement date of the benefit payments
attributable to the amount deferred are known, and the only actuarial
or other assumptions regarding future events or circumstances
needed to determine the amount deferred are interest and
mortality."18 '
If the complexity associated with error correction is simply too
great, one option would be to apply the special tax to contingent
defined benefit plans on the same basis as payroll taxes are applied.
This would not substantially impugn neutrality in most instances. To
see why, consider that if taxpayers were forced to apply the special
tax to a base dependant on estimates, the yield would never be
eligible for capital gains or other preferences, such as those provided
by §§ 243 and 1032. This is because the nondeferred compensation
analogue to a defined benefit plan is an original issue discount debt
instrument issued by the employer, which would generate a yield
taxed as ordinary income.'8 2 Under a wait-and-see approach like the
one used for payroll taxes,'8 3 during the period between when the
employer promises to pay deferred compensation and the time when
the amount of the defined benefit becomes reasonably ascertainable,
the special tax would not apply-but neither would the employer
enjoy an interest deduction for funds constructively borrowed from
the employee."8
Denying the employer the interest deduction
effectively imposes a substitute tax on the employer in lieu of the
special tax (denying the employer an interest deduction increases its
179. I.R.C. § 3121(v) (2000).

180. Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(v)(2)-l(e)(4) (2006).
181. Id. § 31.3121(v)(2)-1(c)(4)(B).
182. An original issue discount ("OD") debt is one in which at least some portion of
the interest component is unstated. See IRC § 1274(a). In the defined benefit context,
because the employer's obligation is to pay an identified sum in the future, it lacks any
stated interest component and, therefore, is akin to an OLD instrument.
183. See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
184. See supra Part III.A.4.
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income). Thus neutrality would only be impaired to the extent that
the employer's marginal tax rate differs from the special tax rate.
There is another reason why taking a wait-and-see approach to
contingent defined benefit plans makes sense. Contingent defined
benefit plans like SERPs are not nearly as tax-motivated as other
forms of deferred compensation. Given that the payout is uncertain
at the outset, the parties themselves cannot reasonably quantify the
foregone compensation. This implies that what is transpiring is not
merely a deferral of current salary; rather, there are likely significant
nontax motivations behind such arrangement (i.e., bonding the
employee to the employer, encouraging the employee to retire upon
reaching an appropriate age, etc.). Because these arrangements are
likely genuine business transactions rather than tax plays,
policymakers should care less about the distortions that may result if
these plans are taxed imperfectly.'85
IV. ACCOUNTING FOR THE COMPENSATORY ELEMENT

In this Part we address the timing of the employee's inclusion of,
and the employer's deduction for, the compensatory element of
deferred compensation. We first discuss defined contribution plans,
then turn to defined benefit plans, and finally address two additional
implications of the timing of inclusion and deduction that are
common to both defined contribution and defined benefit plans: The
liquidity issue raised if taxes are imposed prior to the receipt of cash;
and the neutrality implications if tax rates change over time.
As noted above, the employee's inclusion and the employer's
deduction can be set to occur at any time without impugning
neutrality provided that the amounts included and deducted are
properly adjusted to account for the time value of money. 86 Timing
of inclusion and deduction will, however, have important
administrative implications because in certain cases it will be difficult
to ascertain the information necessary to make proper time value of

185. Compare these SERPs to voluntary salary reduction plans where employees
simply defer a portion of their current salary, which is then set aside for the employee's
ultimate benefit and invested in specified assets. In these arrangements, the employee is
simply "parking" specific assets temporarily with the employer, generally for tax reasons.
186. See supra Part II.C. To be clear, current inclusion and deferred inclusion are
mutually exclusive events. In a current inclusion regime, the compensatory amount is
taxed once and only once, at the beginning of the deferral period. In a deferred inclusion
regime, the compensatory amount is similarly taxed once, only at the end of the deferral
period. The same is true on the deduction side.
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money adjustments; in other cases, this information will be readily
available.
The two most natural times to require inclusion and allow
deduction of the compensatory element are alternatively at the outset
of the deferral period when the right to payment is created ("current"
inclusion or deduction), or at the end of the period when payment is
actually made ("deferred" inclusion or deduction). In the analysis
that follows, we focus on these two options.
A.

Defined ContributionPlans
1. Determining Current Inclusion and Deduction Amounts

In defined contribution arrangements, both the proper current
inclusion and deduction amounts are simply the amount of the
defined contribution. Thus, for defined contribution plans, in most
cases requiring current inclusion, current deduction, or both will be
extremely easy.'87 This will not be true if the employer pays the
special tax without deducting the payments from its future obligation
to the employee 188 or if the rate of return on the deferred
compensation specified by the parties is artificially too high or low.' 89
2. Determining Deferred Inclusion Amounts
The proper deferred inclusion amount is the defined contribution
inflated at the aftertax return rate earned during the period of
deferral. 9 ° Inflating the defined contribution in this manner will
properly compensate the government for the employee's tax deferral.
To see why an aftertax rate is appropriate, consider the following
example:
Example 3. On December 31, Year 0, Employee agrees to
defer compensation of $100,000 until December 31, Year 2, at
which time Employer will pay Employee the amount deferred
plus the investment return thereon. Employer invests the
deferred compensation in a taxable bond yielding 10%.
Employee is subject to a 40% marginal tax rate.

187. See DORAN supra, note 25, at 15.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 111-12 (discussing instances where the
employer pays the special tax with separate funds).
189. See infra Part IV.A.4. (discussing instances of artificially high or low rates of
return).
190. See Stephen J. Willis, Albertson's: Less Emotion and More Reason Would Be
Helpful, 64 TAX NOTES 961, 963 (1994).
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If the compensation had not been deferred, Employee would
have owed tax of $40,000 for Year 0. The ability to defer this liability
is like a $40,000 loan by the government to Employee. If there were
an actual loan, interest of $4,000 would accrue in Year 1.191 The Year
1 interest accrual would, in turn, generate an interest deduction that
would reduce Employee's Year 1 tax liability by $1,600 (40% x
$4,000). Therefore, the net amount owed to the government at the
end of Year 1 would be $42,400, as follows:
Year 0 deferred tax on compensation due gov't
Year 1 deferred interest due gov't
Year 1 deferred tax benefit due Employee
Net amount owed gov't on 12/31/Year 1

$40,000
$4,000
($1,600)
$42,400

For Year 2, Employee would owe interest of $4,240 (10% x
$42,400), giving rise to an interest deduction worth $1,696 (40% x
$4,240). Thus, the net amount owed to the government at the end of
two years would be $44,944, as follows:
Amount owed gov't on 12/31/Year 1
Year 2 deferred interest due gov't
Year 2 deferred tax benefit due Employee
Net amount owed gov't on 12/31/Year 2

$42,400
$4,240
($1,696)
$44,944

The amount included by the employee when she receives the
deferred compensation must yield a tax of $44,944 if the government
is to be fully compensated for the deferral. This implies a deferred
inclusion amount of $112,360.192
If the defined contribution
($100,000) is inflated by the aftertax rate of return earned on the
deferred compensation (6%), the value at the end of the deferral
period is $112,360.113 This demonstrates that if the deferred inclusion
amount is calculated by adjusting (usually increasing) the defined
contribution by an aftertax rate of return, the adjustment properly
compensates the government for Employee's tax deferral.
Making this adjustment is simple in some cases and complex in
others, depending on which party is responsible for remitting the
special tax. If the employer remits the special tax, things are simple
because the deferred compensation ultimately paid will equal the
deferred inclusion amount.1 94
191. This assumes Employee pays the government. a market rate of interest, i.e., 10%.
192. $112,360 x 40% = $44,944.
193. The deferred compensation earns an aftertax amount of 6% regardless of which
party pays the special tax, assuming that the special tax rate matches the employee's
marginal tax rate (10% x (1 - 40%) = 6%).
194. For an illustration, see supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
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If, on the other hand, the employee remits the special tax, things
are significantly more complicated. To see why, consider that each
special tax payment is, in effect, an employee-to-employer loan, as
'
previously discussed. 95
The employee is forced to pay taxes
attributable to the investment yield on the deferred compensation;
meanwhile, the employer enjoys use of that investment yield in its
business without an obligation to pay current interest. When the
employer ultimately pays the employee, a substantial portion of the
payment represents the defined contribution increased by enough to
remunerate the government for the deferral of the compensatory
element. But some of the payment is repayment of the de facto
employee-to-employer loan (and implicit interest thereon) extended
by the employee to the employer each time the employee made a
special tax payment.
This additional portion of the deferred
compensation payment is not part of the compensatory element.
Including it as such would overtax the employee.'9 6
The correct deferred inclusion amount in these circumstances is
(a) the defined contribution (b) increased by the yield earned thereon
during the deferral period and (c) decreased by the employee's
special tax payments (with interest). Parts (a) and (b) are easy to
compute, part (c) is the difficult part. To figure out (c), one must
figure out both the employee's special tax liability each year during
the deferral period and what interest rate should be used to compute
the future value of these liabilities.
The employee's year-by-year special tax liability would be the
difference between the employee's actual tax liability (taking into
account the special tax) and a hypothetical tax liability computed
without considering the special tax. Recall that one important benefit
195. See supra text accompanying note 111 (using this implicit loan analysis when
discussing the computation of the special tax base when the employee pays the special
tax).
196. Another way to explain why using the actual payment amount as the deferred
inclusion amount in cases where the employee pays the special tax is as follows. Where
the employee pays the special tax, the deferred compensation grows by a pretax rate of
return because the employee is paying the special tax out of her own pocket. By contrast,
where the employer pays the special tax, the deferred compensation grows by an aftertax
rate of return because the deferred compensation obligation is reduced by the employer's
special tax payments. Cf supra note 111 and accompanying text (recharacterizing
deferred compensation arrangements that provide for a pretax rate of return despite the
employer's special tax liability). We have already explained that to compute the deferred
inclusion amount, the current inclusion amount must be inflated by the aftertax rate of
return. See supra note 190-92 and accompanying text. Therefore, where the employee
remits the special tax, the actual payment amount (which represents the current inclusion
amount inflated by the pretax rate of return) will be greater than the deferred inclusion
amount whenever the special tax rate is greater than 0%.
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of placing the obligation to remit the special tax on the employee is
that it allows the employee to apply capital gains and other
preferences to the investment yield on deferred compensation, and to
consider other peculiarities of her individual situation, as appropriate.
Taking a shortcut in computing part (c)-for instance, by simply
multiplying the special tax base by the highest marginal tax rate for
individuals-would undermine this benefit. Once the employee's
special tax liabilities for all relevant years have been determined, they
must be adjusted for the time value of money before they are
subtracted from the deferred compensation payment. A proper
discount rate would be the after-special-tax rate of return earned on
the deferred compensation.
To illustrate, recall the facts of Example 3. Suppose that
Employee will pay the special tax and has negotiated for a pretax
return on the deferred compensation. The deferred compensation
would have grown to $121,000 at the end of Year 2." The deferred
inclusion amount should be $121,000 less the periodic special tax
payments by the employee, each inflated to its value on the date the
deferred compensation is paid. In Year 1, Employee would owe a
special tax of $4,000 ($100,000 x 10% x 40%). In Year 2 she would
owe a special tax of $4,400 ($110,000 x 10% x 40%). The sum of
these payments, when inflated to their value on the date of the
payment, is $8,640.198 Thus, the proper deferred inclusion amount is
$112,360 ($121,000 - $8,640). The computation was easy here
because the special tax was computed applying a stipulated tax rate;
however, as a practical matter, this will not be the case. As a result,
deferred inclusion will involve significant administrative complexity if
the special tax is remitted by the employee.1 99
3. Determining Deferred Deduction Amounts
Ascertaining the deferred deduction amount is conceptually
easy. The starting point in figuring the proper amount to deduct is
the amount of the defined contribution. This amount should be
inflated using the aftertax return that the employer would have
197. $100,000 x (1 + 0.1)2= $121,000.
198. The Year 1 special tax payment would be $4,000 ($100,000 x 10% x 40%); when
increased by the aftertax market yield (6%) it is $4,240 ($4,000 x 1.06). Adding $4,240 to
the Year 2 special tax payment of $4,400 ($110,000 x 10% x 40%) yields $8,640.
199. Mechanically, the easiest way to achieve the correct inclusion amount would be
for the employer to report on the employee's W-2 the entire deferred compensation
payment and allow the employee to deduct the time value adjusted amount of special tax
paid. This two-step method would be necessary because employers would ordinarily not
know the amount of special tax paid by the employee.
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earned if it had instead received a current deduction and invested the
resulting tax benefit in an investment with a term equal to the
deferral period.
What is the appropriate interest rate that the employer should
earn on this hypothetical loan?
In a deferred compensation
arrangement, the employer bears market risk, since its future
2 00
obligation to its employee vacillates with the benchmark security.
The interest rate on the hypothetical government-to-employer loan
must reflect this risk. Accordingly, the starting point for figuring the
interest rate on the hypothetical government-to-employer loan is the
pretax rate of return on the benchmark to which the deferred
compensation is pegged. This rate of return must be adjusted to
account for the fact that the interest on the hypothetical governmentto-employer loan would have been taxable to the employer if it were
an actual loan. As a result, to calculate the deferred deduction
amount, the current deduction amount must be inflated by the pretax
return on the deferred compensation after adjustments for the
government's foregone taxes on that return.
To illustrate, recall the facts of Example 3. Assuming that the
Employer is subject to a 30% marginal tax rate, if the $100,000 of
compensation had been paid currently, Employer would have
received a deduction worth $30,000 ($100,000 x 30%).
If this
deduction is deferred, it is analogous to a loan by Employer to the
government in exchange for the government's promise to repay the
$30,000 plus interest through a future reduction in tax. The term of
this hypothetical loan equals the term of the deferral period. On
these numbers, the deferred deduction amount equals $114,490,
which is the defined contribution ($100,000) inflated by the aftertax
return (7%) that would have been earned by Employer had it made
an investment in the benchmark security. This deduction is worth
$34,347,21 which is the same amount that Employer would have
accumulated had it invested the value of the foregone current
deduction in the benchmark security during the deferral period.2 2
Calculating deferred deduction amounts with precision would
appear to be infeasible as a practical matter. To do so, for the first
year of deferral, the defined contribution amount would need to be
200. Of course, the employer could hedge this risk by taking a long position in the
benchmark security. The decision to hedge, however, can be seen as a financing decision
that is independent of the choice regarding when to pay compensation. Accordingly, we
ignore this possibility in evaluating the proper treatment of deferred compensation.
201. $114,490 x 30% = $34,347.
202. $100,000 x 30% x (1 + .07)2 = 34,347.
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increased by the aftertax return the employer would have earned had
it invested the deferred compensation in the security or index to
which the deferred compensation is pegged. For Year 2, the resulting
amount would then be increased in the same manner. And so on
until the deferred compensation is paid. From an administrative
standpoint, these calculations would seem to create significant
hardship.
Although the year-by-year return on the deferred
compensation benchmark might be ascertainable, figuring the
hypothetical tax the employer would have paid on that return would
be extremely difficult.
One "rough justice" solution would be to use the actual payment
amount, provided that the obligation to remit the special tax is placed
on the employer. Professor Halperin suggests this option.2 °3 If the
employer remits the special tax, the actual payment amount would
only differ from the proper deferred deduction amount to the extent
that the employer's marginal tax rate differed from the special tax
rate.2 °4 If these rates differ, using the actual payment amount would
create an incentive or disincentive to pay deferred compensation, all
else being equal. 2 5 Nevertheless, if deferring the deduction is an
important goal, the extreme administrative ease of this option makes
it attractive, despite its imprecision.
To sum up, designing a rule to calculate the correct deferred
deduction amount with precision will be impossible as a practical
matter. The only reasonably administrable option would be to use
the actual payment amount as the deduction amount, provided that
the employer pays the special tax, with the understanding that this
would not yield perfect results in many cases.
4. Anti-Abuse Issues
Absent some legal restriction, the parties could specify a yield for
their defined contribution plan that is unrealistically high or low, to
their collective benefit. For example, assume that the parties intend
that the employee will be paid $1,000,000 in 10 years. They could
achieve this by contracting for a $463,193 defined contribution and a
203. Halperin, supra note 22, at 550 & n.166.
204. When the employer remits the special tax, the deferred compensation grows by
the after-special-tax rate of return. See supra note 196. If the special tax rate
approximates the employer's marginal tax rate, then the actual payment amount would
approximate the proper deferred deduction amount.
205. If the employer's marginal tax rate is higher, then using the actual payment
amount will overstate the deferred deduction, resulting in an incentive to pay deferred
compensation. If the special tax rate is higher, then using the actual payment amount will
understate the deferred deduction, resulting in an incentive to pay current compensation.
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fixed return of 8%, assumed to be a market rate. Alternatively, the
parties could arrange for an $820,348 defined contribution and a fixed
return of 2%. Ignoring tax consequences, the parties would be
indifferent between these alternatives given that the payout is the
same in both.
Once taxes are considered, however, the options are no longer
equivalent if the employer and the employee face different marginal
rates. Under a current inclusion and current deduction regime, the
2% alternative will overtax the employer and undertax the employee
by overstating the compensatory element ($820,348 instead of
$463,193) while understating the yield ($179,652 instead of $536,807).
This would result in the employee including too much income in Year
1 and not enough in Years 2 through 10, while the employer deducts
too much in Year 1 and not enough in Years 2 through 10. Although
the nominal amount of the errors in Year 1, on the one hand, and
Years 2 through 10 in the aggregate, on the other, would offset,2 °6
considering the time value of money, the overtaxation of the
employee in Year 1 outweighs the undertaxation of the employee in
Years 2 through 10, and vice versa for the employer. Although the
employee will be overtaxed by the same amount the employer is
undertaxed if their marginal tax rates are identical, if these rates are
different the parties can turn the mistaxation to their advantage by
minimizing their aggregate tax liability and sharing the savings by
adjusting the nominal amount of deferred compensation.2 7
To address this, a reform proposal would need to prevent the
parties from contracting for artificially high or low yields. For
instance, the Code or regulations could provide that the parties'
defined contribution arrangement should be respected only if the
agreed upon rate of return is reasonable. A rate of return should
automatically be deemed reasonable if it is based on a predetermined
actual investment held by the employer because an actual investment
206. The employee includes $357,155 extra in Year 1 (as compared with the market
rate arrangement), but includes $357,155 too little in Years 2 through 10. Conversely, the
employer deducts $357,155 too much in Year 1, but deducts $357,155 too little in Years 2
through 10.
207. If deduction and inclusion are deferred until payment, the incentives will run in
the opposite direction. Because the compensatory element would always equal $1,000,000
at the time of payout (i.e., the time of the inclusion and deduction event), manipulating
the yield will only affect the special tax liability of the employee and the complementary
employer interest deduction. Understating this yield would result in undertaxation of the

employee and overtaxation of the employer (and vice versa in the case of overstatement of
the yield). As a result, the parties would have the incentive to understate the yield when
the employee is subject to higher marginal tax rates than the employer (and overstate the
yield when the employer is subject to higher marginal tax rates).
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return is obviously realistic."0 8 In the absence of an actual investment,
whether the negotiated rate of return is reasonable should be based

209
on the facts and circumstances present at the time the rate is set. If
a rate of return is determined to be unreasonable, then the present

value of the defined contribution could be determined using a market

rate of interest.
5. Summary
Current inclusion and deduction amounts are easy to ascertain
with precision in almost all cases. The same cannot be said with
respect to deferred inclusion and deduction amounts.
Deferred inclusion is straightforward if the special tax is remitted
by the employer; in such a case, the proper inclusion amount would
equal the amount actually paid. If the special tax were instead
remitted by the employee, it would be quite onerous to calculate the

deferred deduction amount.
A deferred deduction regime could not achieve perfectly neutral
results, as a practical matter. The best administrable option is to
allow the employer a deduction for the amount paid, but this would
require that the obligation to remit the special tax be placed on the

employer.
B.

Defined Benefit Plans

Some defined benefit plans-i.e., plans where the payout is
specified but the contribution is not-present greater challenges to

taxing deferred compensation neutrally than defined contribution
plans. The principal difficulty arises in the case of defined benefit
plans with a formulaic defined benefit. For instance, certain plans-

for example, SERPs-commonly tie the amount and timing of the
payout to such factors as the employee's salary and bonus during her
208. For this predetermined actual investment safe harbor to apply, the parties'
arrangement would have to correctly account for which of the parties bears the special tax.
If the employer bears the special tax, the employee's account ought to be reduced by the
special tax liability; otherwise, the employee's return is excessively high. See supra notes
111-12 and accompanying text (discussing this scenario and suggesting that the transaction
be correctly taxed by either recasting the defined contribution as higher than stated or
treating each special tax payment as additional compensation). Likewise, if the employee
bears the special tax, the employee's account ought to grow by the pretax return generated
by the investment; otherwise, the employee's return is too low.
209. We imagine a rule evaluating the "reasonableness" of a given rate in a manner
akin to Treas. Reg. § 1.1274-3(b)(3) (2006) (defining "clearly excessive interest" as an
amount "clearly greater" than the amount of interest that would have been charged
between the two parties had the same transaction been consummated at arm's length).
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last years with the employer, the length of her tenure, and interaction
with other retirement plans such as qualified plans and Social
Security. We will refer to these plans as "contingent defined benefit
plans." The problem with such plans is estimating the present value
of the future benefit at the outset. As noted above in our discussions
of the special tax base and the attendant difficulty of determining the
proper amount to include and deduct, the present value of the future
benefit is a necessary input into the policymaker's calculus.2 10
On the other hand, neutral taxation of defined benefit plans with
a fixed payout date and amount is relatively straightforward. For
instance, consider an arrangement that requires the employer to pay
the employee (or her heirs) $1 million in thirty years. The present
value of the defined benefit will be easy to ascertain if, as we suggest
above, a proxy rate is used to gauge the interest rate earned by the
employee on the loan implicit in the deferred compensation.2 '
Calling such plans defined benefit plans as opposed to defined
contribution plans is more semantic than substantive. There is no
difference between the plan described above (fixed defined benefit of
$1 million payable in thirty years) and a plan that specifies that the
employer will make a defined contribution of $99,377, to grow for the
employee's benefit at an aftertax rate of 8%, since, in either case, the
employee will receive $1 million in thirty years. Given that such
defined benefit plans are economically similar to (in some cases
identical to) defined contribution plans, what we have said about
defined contribution plans applies to these plans too, and we will not
discuss them separately.
We discuss, first, how to determine current inclusion and current
deduction amounts for contingent defined benefit plans, second, how
to determine deferred inclusion amounts for these plans, and third,
how to compute deferred deduction amounts.
1. Determining Current Inclusion and Deduction Amounts
A typical SERP might provide for a continuation of salary based
on a percentage of the executive's final pay, reduced by qualified plan
and Social Security benefits. 12 The proper current inclusion and
current deduction amounts are the present value of the defined

210. See supra Part III.B.
211. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
212. See Brisendine et al., supra note 31, at A-6.
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benefit. To determine present value, all of the inputs into the payout

formula must be estimated.213
Making reliable estimates would be exceedingly difficult. It is

unclear whether the ex ante predictions would result in an estimate
within a tolerable range, even if we ignore the advantages taxpayers
might gain by perverting estimates to minimize their taxes.2" 4 Once
taxpayer self-interest is factored into the analysis, the outlook for
reliable estimates grows dim. One possibility-discussed above-is to

use an error correction or "true up" mechanism to correct past errors,
although this would add complexity.2 1

2. Determining Deferred Inclusion Amounts
As with defined contribution plans, the deferred inclusion
amount is easy to calculate if the employer pays the special tax. In
this case, it is simply the benefit paid. 16 If the employee pays the
special tax, however, computing the deferred inclusion amount is
more complex. As described above, each special tax payment by the

employee is, in effect, an employee-to-employer loan. When the
employer ultimately pays the employee, a portion of the payment
represents repayment of this de facto employee-to-employer loan,
plus interest. This portion of the defined benefit is not part of the
compensatory element. It must be subtracted when computing the
deferred inclusion amount. The difficulties this would entail are the
same for defined contribution and defined benefit plans.217

213. Furthermore, if the percentage of final pay target varies with length of service, this
too must be estimated. For example, assume that the executive is to receive 50% of final
pay (after reductions for qualified plan and Social Security benefits) upon retirement, but
this percentage is increased two percentage points (but not above 100%) for every year of
service beyond twenty years. To estimate present value, the expected retirement date
must be determined. See supra Part III.B.
214. Given a regime that provides for both current inclusion and deduction, the parties
would have competing incentives. Understating the present value of the defined benefit
would reduce the employee's inclusion, but it would also diminish the employer's
deduction. If the parties face equivalent marginal tax rates, any overtaxation of the
employer would perfectly offset undertaxation of the employee, keeping tax planning in
check. If their marginal tax rates differ, however, this analysis breaks down; the parties
could plan to either over or understate the amount included and deducted to their mutual
advantage, sharing the tax savings between themselves by adjusting the nominal pretax
amount.
215. See supraPart III.B.
216. See supra note 194 and accompanying text (noting that, where the employer
remits the special tax, the amount ultimately paid equals the deferred inclusion amount).
217. See supra notes 194-99 and accompanying text.
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3. Determining Deferred Deduction Amounts
Recall that for defined contribution plans, the appropriate
deferred deduction is the defined contribution inflated at a rate
comparable to the aftertax rate that the employer would have earned
had it received a current deduction and then loaned the value of the
deduction to the government for a term equal to the deferral period
for the plan." 8 The pretax yield on this loan would be tied to the
return earned on the deferred compensation.
In the defined contribution context, we concluded that, if
deferring the deduction were an important goal, the only feasible
option would be to place the obligation to remit the special tax on the
employer and to use the actual payment amount. 2 9 Although this
option will often be imprecise, the cost of additional precision would
appear to outweigh its benefit. Our conclusion is the same for
defined benefit plans.
It is important to emphasize that the inability to estimate reliably
the present value of the employer's promise, which renders current
inclusion and deduction administratively impractical for contingent
defined benefit plans, does not arise if the employee's inclusion and
the employer's deduction is deferred. This is because the amount of
the inclusion and deduction need not be figured until payment, at
which time all contingencies have been resolved.2 20
4. Summary
Computing the current inclusion and deduction amounts for
contingent defined benefit plans is likely to be fraught with error.
The computation will frequently depend on estimates of such factors
as future salary, time until retirement, and interaction with other
retirement plans. None of these things can reliably be estimated. The
likelihood that taxpayers would exploit this uncertainty by perverting
estimates militates in favor of an ex post "true up" to correct past
errors to deter opportunistic planning, which in turn would magnify
complexity.
Computing the deferred inclusion and deduction amounts for
contingent defined benefit plans is comparatively easy, provided that

218. See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 203-05 and accompanying text.
220. While deferring inclusion and deduction in the contingent defined benefit context
will solve the estimation problem with regard to the compensatory element, the problem
nevertheless persists with regard to the calculation of the special tax. See supra notes 17578.
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the employer remits the special tax. The calculations follow the same
pattern as for defined contribution plans.
C.

Liquidity

In a current inclusion regime, tax would be imposed on the
employee prior to her receipt of cash. This raises liquidity concerns,
which some have considered significant enough to preclude a current
inclusion regime. 21 We believe the importance of the liquidity issue
has been exaggerated.
The inclusion of the compensatory element by the employee will
trigger a wage-withholding obligation for the employer.222 The
employer would satisfy its obligation by withholding a greater amount
of the employee's cash compensation; alternatively, the employer
could require, as a condition of the deferred compensation
arrangement, that the employee remit the required withholding
amount to the employer.2 23
Each of these scenarios could
theoretically create a liquidity problem for the employee as they
would impair her current cash position.
However, given the
wherewithal
of executives
remunerated
through
deferred
compensation arrangements and the fact that the executives who
choose to participate are willing to defer the receipt of large amounts
of cash for long periods, employee liquidity concerns rarely will be
implicated.22 4
In these rare cases, an employer could solve the problem. If the
employer has cash on hand-for instance, cash from tax savings
attributable to its current compensation deduction 22 5-or access to
credit, it would be able to satisfy its withholding obligation. 226 Thus a

221. See, e.g., Halperin, supra note 22, at 542 (identifying liquidity concerns as a
"serious obstacle[] to immediate accrual taxation of all compensation").
222. We assume the employer will have the same reporting obligations it has with
respect to wages as under current law.
223. Such a condition is common in cases where an employee receives a significant
amount of noncash compensation, particularly stock and nonqualified stock options. John
L. Utz, Restricted Property-Section 83, Tax Mgmt. Portfolio (BNA) No. 384, at A-62
(2001) (noting prevalence of this withholding arrangement in the context of restricted
stock grants).
224. Also, in defined contribution arrangements where parties agree that the employer
will "fund" the plan by setting aside certain assets, the parties could restructure for a
reduced set-aside amount, thus freeing up assets to satisfy the withholding tax.
225. This of course assumes that a current inclusion regime is paired with a current
deduction regime, as we have concluded is preferable with respect to defined contribution
arrangements. See supra Part IV.A.5.
226. Under current law, the employer does not receive a current deduction; therefore,
the employer's current tax liability will (all else being equal) be lower after reform. This
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current inclusion regime would impose a hardship on taxpayers in a
very small number of cases.
Even if, as a realistic matter, liquidity is almost never a concern
for the typical deferred compensation beneficiary, it still may be
difficult politically to pass reform that would impose large tax
burdens on employees (even high-ranking corporate executives)
before they receive cash. For this reason, some have predicted that
reform of the tax rules governing deferring compensation will
inevitably perpetuate current law by allowing the employee to defer
inclusion of the compensatory element, 2 7 although recent legislation
may belie this prediction.2 8
D. Changing Tax Rates
If a deferred inclusion regime is implemented, unstable tax rates
will impugn neutrality. Under such a regime, if the employee's
marginal tax rate decreases between the beginning and end of the
deferral period, the parties will be better off (all else being equal)
structuring for deferred rather current compensation. Alternatively,
if the employee's marginal tax rate increases, the parties will be better
off structuring for current rather than deferred compensation. This
occurs because, even though the base of the tax (i.e., the
compensatory element) is appropriately adjusted for the time value of
money, the tax rate that applies when figuring the tax liability would

reduced tax liability would free up cash to pay the withholding tax, assuming that the
employer is in a taxable position.
Where the employer satisfies the withholding obligation out of its own funds (as
compared with funds that would otherwise be payable to the employee as compensation),
two issues arise. First, this would result in additional tax liability (and, as a result, another
withholding obligation) in that the employer is paying the employee's tax liability. See
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 279 U.S. 716, 729-30 (1929) (holding that when
employer satisfies employee's federal tax liability, it results in additional income for
employee). Second, this would result in more compensation paid to the employee than
originally contemplated; accordingly, the parties would need to reduce the employee's
future compensation to achieve the intended level of compensation.
227. See Halperin, supra note 22, at 542 (concluding that a "lack of employee
understanding of the accrual method ... may be the most serious obstacle to
implementing [an accrual method system]"); cf Terrence R. Chorvat, Perception and
Income: The Behavioral Economics of the Realization Doctrine, 36 CONN. L. REV. 75,
101-11 (2003) (discussing behavioral economics research suggesting that people do not
conceive of themselves as wealthier until property appreciation is reduced to cash).
228. See I.R.C. § 409A (West Supp. 2006) (originally enacted as American Jobs
Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 109-357, § 885(a), 118 Stat. 1418, 1634 (2004)) (imposing
accrual taxation on certain deferred compensation arrangements). However, § 409A is
viewed as a penalty on nonconforming deferred compensation arrangements, not as
imposing accrual taxation generally.
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differ. This issue pushes in favor of current inclusion but, as we
explain below, we do not think it is very significant.
Employees who structure significant amounts of deferred
compensation will almost always be permanently subject to the
highest statutory marginal rates. 229 As a result, the only factor causing
rate fluctuation will in most cases be legislative change. All else being
equal, deciding between current and deferred compensation (under a
deferred inclusion regime) would essentially involve a bet on how
statutory tax rates will move during the often lengthy deferral period.
Given the speculative nature of this bet, we believe that the impact of
employee tax rate fluctuation is best ignored.230
CONCLUSIONS

Our principal conclusions are as follows.
1. Imposing a special tax on deferred compensation investment
yield is necessary to a neutral deferred compensation tax regime.
2. Determining which party should remit the special tax on
deferred compensation investment yield is complex. Viewing the
issue in isolation, we conclude that there is a strong case for imposing
the tax on the employee, so the rate of tax and available tax
preferences can be gauged by the employee's individual
circumstance. 231 However, imposing the tax on the employee has
significant drawbacks, as discussed in conclusions 3 and 4.
3. If the employee remits the special tax then, for reasons
described in Parts IV.A.2 and IV.A.3, it is difficult to account for the
compensatory element of the deferred compensation program at the
time of payment-that is, it is difficult to determine how much
income should be included, and how much the employee should be
permitted to deduct, when the deferred compensation is paid.
Therefore, if the employee remits the special tax, administrative
229. See DORAN, supra note 25, at 16 (noting the wealth of typical deferred
compensation recipients).
230. Some might argue that, because of nonlegislative marginal tax rate fluctuations
(because, e.g., of a taxpayer's fluctuating levels of income), a deferred inclusion regime,
while resulting in nonneutrality, might be normatively preferred. This argument would be
based on the notion that self-help income averaging ought to be permitted. Halperin,
supra note 22, at 549. We believe that this argument is not persuasive because affected
employees will almost always be subject to the highest marginal rates for the duration of
their lives. See id. (noting "the marginal rate of very high earners will not be reduced
significantly, if at all, upon retirement"). Furthermore, it is difficult to justify allowing
certain select ultra-rich taxpayers to engage in this self-help while other taxpayers suffer
from the inability to income average.
231. See Part III.A.2.
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considerations counsel for inclusion and deduction of the
compensatory element of deferred compensation-as distinct from
the yield thereon-at the time of the employer's promise. Taxing the
employee in this fashion raises liquidity concerns that have been
emphasized in previous academic work. We conclude that concern
over the employee's liquidity has been overblown, but may have
political salience.
4. If the employer remits the special tax, on the other hand, then
the policymaker has substantial additional flexibility regarding when
to account for the compensatory element of the deferred
compensation.
Administrable rules are feasible to include the
deferred compensation at the outset (i.e., at the time of the
employer's promise) or upon payment. Thus, if concern over
liquidity or other factors leads policymakers to defer taxing
compensation until payment, administrative factors militate strongly
towards placing the obligation to remit the special tax on the
employer.
5. Finally, neutral taxation of contingent defined benefit plans
raises one seemingly insuperable administrative challenge-how to
determine the present value of the employer's contingent future
promise. We suggest that policymakers design rules that take a waitand-see approach, allowing taxpayers to defer taking account of both
the special tax and the compensatory element until the amount of the
defined benefit is reasonably ascertainable. Although not ideal in
theory, no neutral regime is possible until this information is known.

